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Oil and Water: Mixing Taxable and Tax-Exempt 
Shareholders in Mutual Funds 
Jeffrey M. Colon* 
As of 2012, roughly 23% of U.S. households’ assets and 50% of 
retirement assets are invested in mutual funds, thus making mutual 
funds one of the most important investment vehicles for U.S. 
households.  The federal taxation of mutual funds and mutual fund 
shareholders has played a vital role in the development of mutual funds 
and their appeal to U.S. investors. 
Despite the significant amount of mutual fund assets held in 
retirement accounts, there has been very little analysis of the issues that 
arise when taxable and tax-exempt shareholders invest together in the 
same mutual fund.  A substantial body of research shows that managers 
are attuned to the tax consequences of their investment activities, but 
only very recently have researchers begun to explore how the presence 
of tax-exempt investors affects managers’ investment strategies. 
 The current tax regime governing mutual funds imposes tax 
externalities on both taxable and tax-exempt shareholders.  When tax-
exempt shareholders predominate, fund managers focus less on 
managing fund tax liability and thereby generate higher taxes and 
lower after-tax returns for taxable shareholders.  When taxable 
shareholders hold a significant portion of a mutual fund’s assets, the 
fund manager, focusing on minimizing fund taxable income, may 
undertake trades that reduce fund income but do not add economic 
value.  These trades impose costs on all shareholders but benefit only 
taxable shareholders. 
 This Article considers various options to mitigate these costs, such as 
requiring funds to disclose the percentage of tax-exempt investors, 
adopting principles from partnership taxation to better match taxable 
and economic income, and prohibiting a fund from being offered to both 
taxable and tax-exempt investors. 
 
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  I would like to thank W. Hardy 
Callcott, David Danon, Alan Levine, Barnet Phillips IV, Tyler Robbins, and Steve Thel for their 
comments on prior drafts and Roman Asudalayev for his research assistance. 
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 This Article concludes that tax externalities resulting from taxable 
and tax-exempt investment in the same mutual fund are unavoidable 
absent substantial changes to the basic architecture of mutual fund 
taxation.  Because such changes seem unlikely and would create other 
issues, this Article suggests revising the tax law to permit the creation of 
a special class of mutual fund, the “Retirement Mutual Fund,” solely 
for retirement accounts.  A Retirement Mutual Fund would be subject to 
an alternative tax regime that would mitigate tax externalities for both 
tax-exempt and taxable shareholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mutual funds are one of the most important investment assets of U.S. 
individuals, accounting for 23% of U.S. households’ financial assets at 
the end of 2011.1  In fact, there are more mutual funds than companies 
listed on the major U.S. exchanges.2  Mutual funds account for over 
55% of the assets in defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) and 
403(b) plans, and 45% of assets in individual retirement accounts 
(“IRAs”).3 
Mutual funds offer many advantages to investors—especially 
investors with limited capital—such as diversification, daily liquidity, 
and the opportunity to obtain economic exposure to asset classes that 
would otherwise be difficult for an ordinary investor to obtain directly.4  
Also, when an investor acquires shares of an actively managed mutual 
fund, she gains exposure to the possible alpha-enhancing skills of the 
fund manager.5 
 The current mutual fund tax regime was established in the 1930s and 
1940s.  If an entity satisfies the requirements to be treated as a regulated 
investment company (“RIC”),6 it avoids entity-level tax by distributing 
its income.7  A fund’s shareholders are taxed on the fund’s income 
under a quasi pass-through system in which most income distributed to 
a fund’s shareholders retains the same character it had in the hands of 
the fund. 
The current RIC tax regime was forged in an era when there were no 
self-directed, defined contribution plans, and many of its requirements 
are irrelevant for tax-exempt shareholders.  Nevertheless, tax-exempt 
 
1. INV. CO. INST., 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK 10 fig.1.2 (2012). 
2. For 2011, there were 16,506 investment companies, consisting of 8684 mutual funds, 634 
closed-end funds, 1166 Exchanged Traded Funds (“ETFs”), and 6022 Unit Investment Trusts 
(“UITs”).  Id. at 18 fig.1.11.  The number of listings in 2008 on the principal U.S. exchanges—
NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange, and American Stock Exchange—totaled 5401.  David 
Weild & Edward Kim, A Wake-up Call for America, CAP. MARKETS SERIES (Grant Thornton, 
London, U.K.), Nov. 2009, at 1. 
3. INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 11 fig.1.4. 
4. Examples of such assets include commodities and foreign stock and bonds. 
5. In theory, a professional fund manager may be able to avoid some of the behavioral biases 
of unsophisticated investors.  Even if that is so, managers may not be able to generate sufficient 
alpha to overcome their expenses to provide superior returns.  See, e.g., Kenneth R. French, The 
Cost of Active Investing, 63 J. FIN. 1537, 1537–39 (2008). 
6. Subchapter M (sections 851 through 860G) of the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”) 
addresses the taxation of RICs, real estate investment trusts (“REITs”), and real estate mortgage 
investment conduits (“REMICs”).  See I.R.C. §§ 851–860G (2012). 
7. See id. § 852 (describing taxation of RICs and their shareholders); id. § 854 (outlining 
treatment of dividend received from RICs).  For a discussion of the computation of a mutual 
fund’s investment company taxable income, see infra Part II.C. 
COLON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  10:41 PM 
776 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  45 
shareholders bear their share of many direct and indirect costs imposed 
by the RIC tax regime.  For example, a distribution from a RIC can thus 
be characterized in the hands of a RIC shareholder as an ordinary 
dividend, qualified dividend, net capital gain, or tax-exempt interest.8  
Determining and assigning these amounts to fund shareholders requires 
sophisticated tax compliance systems.  Tax-exempt shareholders, such 
as IRAs and 401(k) and 403(b) plans, are indifferent to the character of 
RIC distributions, but they bear their share of a fund’s tax compliance 
costs. 
Another example is the cost of compliance with the RIC distribution 
requirement—a fundamental component of the RIC tax regime.  To 
qualify as a RIC, a company must generally distribute annually the sum 
of 90% of its taxable income and tax-exempt interest.9  To the extent 
that a RIC does not distribute its investment income, it is subject to 
entity-level tax,10 and if it fails to distribute 98% of its ordinary income 
and capital gain net income, it is subject to a nondeductible 4% excise 
tax.11  Although one of the purported goals of the distribution 
requirement is to ensure that shareholders will have sufficient cash to 
satisfy their tax liability, this concern is entirely irrelevant for tax-
exempt shareholders.  Yet, they still bear their share of the fund’s 
distribution costs. 
In addition to the tax compliance and distribution costs, tax-exempt 
shareholders may also bear trading costs incurred by managers 
undertaking trades to lower a fund’s (and shareholders’) income.  The 
basic story is as follows: A taxable shareholder is concerned with a 
fund’s after-tax returns.  A fund manager is concerned with generating 
returns in order to increase assets under management (“AUM”) as 
manager compensation is generally based on AUM, and investors seek 
funds with higher returns.  Taxable investors, however, unlike tax-
exempt investors, generally look to after-tax returns.  Consequently, a 
manager that aims to maximize after-tax returns so as to increase AUM 
may undertake trades to lower a fund’s taxable income that have no 
effect on a fund’s return.12  For taxable shareholders, a trade that lowers 
a RIC’s taxable income but is not expected to generate a positive risk-
 
8. See infra Part II.D. 
9. I.R.C. § 852(a)(1); see infra Part II.C. 
10. I.R.C. §§ 852(b)(1)–(2).  A RIC is technically subject to tax on its investment company 
taxable income and its net capital gains, but these amounts are reduced by dividends paid by the 
RIC.  Consequently, a RIC that distributes all of its investment company taxable income and net 
capital gains is not subject to entity-level tax.  See infra Part II.C. 
11. See I.R.C. § 4982.  This issue is discussed infra in Part II.B. 
12. For example, a manager may realize losses to offset realized gains, or if a fund has a 
capital loss carryforward, a manager may realize capital gains. 
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adjusted return can still be beneficial.  These tax-motivated trades, 
however, generate costs that are borne by all shareholders but benefit 
only taxable shareholders.  On the other hand, the taxes of taxable 
investors will be accelerated, and they will have smaller after-tax 
accumulations if managers prioritize the interests of tax-exempt 
investors. 
Over the last two decades, the percentage and amount of fund assets 
held by tax-exempt investors has soared.  By the end of 2011, about 
26% of the $17.9 trillion of U.S. retirement assets were invested in 
mutual funds, and this amount represented approximately 40% of the 
total assets of U.S. RICs.13  Among a large sample of equity funds from 
19972010, tax-exempt assets constituted about 32% of the total on a 
weighted-average basis.14  As the proportion of tax-exempt assets 
increases, it appears that managers become less concerned with 
minimizing fund taxable income and distributions.  In such funds, the 
taxes of taxable investors will be accelerated, and they will have smaller 
after-tax accumulations.  The increasing presence of tax-exempt 
investors thus can cause managers to take actions that harm taxable 
investors. 
This Article explores issues that arise when taxable and tax-exempt 
shareholders invest in the same RIC.  Parts I and II examine the 
historical development and contours of the current RIC tax regime.  Part 
III briefly describes the development of self-directed, tax-exempt 
retirement plans such as IRAs and 401(k) plans and how RICs have 
become the most important investment vehicles for such plans.  Part IV 
next explores the cost of RIC taxes, how the presence of tax-exempt 
investors may make managers less attuned to the tax consequences of 
their investment decisions and thereby reduce the after-tax 
accumulations of taxable investors, and how certain aspects of the RIC 
tax regime may create incentives for managers to undertake actions that 
generate deadweight costs that can harm tax-exempt investors.  At a 
minimum, investors and fiduciaries should find this analysis useful in 
deciding which funds to invest in or offer to beneficiaries. 
Part V concludes by examining several potential policy responses to 
mitigate these costs.  These responses include requiring funds to 
disclose the percentage of tax-exempt AUM, prohibiting co-investment 
 
13. INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 124. 
14. Clemens Sialm & Laura Starks, Mutual Fund Tax Clienteles, 67 J. FIN. 1397, 1402 (2012).  
On an equal-weighted basis, the proportion of tax-exempt assets was 25%.  This suggests that 
larger funds had a greater proportion of tax-exempt assets.  See id. (highlighting the distribution 
of mutual fund assets).  Importantly, assets of IRAs, which represent about 50% of retirement 
assets in mutual funds, were not included in this study.  Id. at 1401 n.9. 
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by taxable and tax-exempt shareholders, and adopting principles from 
partnership taxation to better match taxable and economic income. 
Finally, this Article considers and suggests that Congress should 
create a new class of mutual funds designed solely for tax-exempt 
investors, the “Retirement Mutual Fund,” which would be free of many 
of the expensive tax burdens that affect only taxable investors and 
would ameliorate the conflicts that currently arise when taxable and tax-
exempt shareholders invest in the same fund. 
I. TAXES AND THE GENESIS OF THE MODERN MUTUAL FUND 
Federal tax laws have played an enormous role in the development of 
mutual funds.  Without the accommodating boundaries of the 
predecessor (and current) provisions of Subchapter M,15 it is highly 
unlikely that mutual funds would have witnessed the same spectacular 
growth over the last eighty years.16  These rules, however, were largely 
developed before the creation of self-directed retirement accounts and 
therefore focus exclusively on issues of taxable shareholders. 
Investment companies pool resources from multiple investors to 
invest in diversified portfolios of stock or securities of other companies.  
They first rose to prominence in the United States in the 1920s when the 
U.S. stock market boomed.17  During that period, all investment 
companies operated as closed-end companies.  A closed-end company 
issues shares to investors and invests the shareholder-provided capital in 
stocks and securities.  To liquidate an investment in a closed-end 
company, a shareholder generally must sell his shares to a third-party 
purchaser.  Although the price a buyer would theoretically pay for a 
share of a closed-end fund should be equal to the fund’s per share net 
asset value (“NAV”), the share price of closed-end funds is often traded 
at significant premiums or discounts to NAV.18 
 
15. The tax rules for mutual funds are found in sections 851 through 855, which are Part I of 
Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code.  I.R.C. §§ 851–855. 
16. Assets of U.S. mutual funds have grown from $450 million in 1940 to nearly $12 trillion 
in 2011 (including exchanged-traded funds and unit investment trusts).  INV. CO. INST., supra 
note 1, at 134 tbl.1. 
17. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT 
COMPANIES, H.R. DOC. NO. 75-707, pt. 1, at 56–108 (1939). 
18. MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER’S VIEW 9–10 (2008); see 
H.R. DOC. NO. 75-707, pt. 2, at 322.  The existence of premiums and discounts in closed-end 
funds continues today, and there is still no consensus among financial economists as to the 
causes.  See, e.g., Kenneth J. Boudreaux, Discounts and Premiums on Closed-end Mutual Funds: 
A Study in Valuation, 28 J. FIN. 515, 515–16 (1973) (discussing the most common explanations); 
Charles Lee et al., Anomalies: Closed End Mutual Funds, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 154–55 (1990) 
(noting that the pricing of closed-end funds presents several questions).  The existence of closed-
end fund premiums and discounts and the inability to trade open-end funds at intraday prices 
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The first open-end mutual fund in the United States, the 
Massachusetts Investors Trust, appeared in 1924.19  The defining 
characteristics of an open-end fund are an investor’s right to demand 
redemption of his shares from the mutual fund based on the fund’s 
NAV and the continuous offering of new shares at NAV by the fund.20  
The creation of open-end funds was intended to mitigate some of the 
perceived deficiencies of the closed-end company such as shares trading 
at a discount to NAV and the lack of liquidity.21 
During the 1920s and 1930s, closed-end funds dominated open-end 
funds.  In 1929, for example, assets of open-end funds comprised only 
2% of the assets of all investment companies.22  Most of the remaining 
assets were held by closed-end funds.23 
Prior to 1935, the federal tax regime imposed relatively low costs on 
closed-end and open-end funds.24  Closed-end funds and other 
investment entities organized as corporations did not pay tax on 
dividends from portfolio stock because intercompany dividends were 
exempt from income tax in the hands of corporate shareholders.25  
When an investment company paid a dividend to a shareholder, the 
dividend was taxed like a dividend from any corporation.  At that time, 
dividends received by individuals were exempt from the “normal” 
income tax but were subject to the “surtax” rate.26  Consequently, 
 
helped stimulate the creation of ETFs in the 1990s. 
19. FINK, supra note 18, at 11. 
20. The Massachusetts Investors Trust (“MIT”) charged a redemption fee of $2 per share.  A 
1924 MIT offering circular shows an issue price of $52.50 per share.  A redemption fee of $2 
would have been approximately 4% of the issue price.  Id. at 12; see H.R. DOC. NO. 75-707, pt. 1, 
at 101–02. 
21. See FINK, supra note 18, at 13–14. 
22. H.R. DOC. NO. 75-707, pt. 2, at 27. 
23. Id.  The total of all investment company assets as of December 31, 1929 was $7.1 billion: 
open-end funds had $140 million of assets and closed-end funds, including management 
investment-holding companies, had $5.52 billion or 77%; the remaining assets were held by fixed 
investment trusts (trusts holding a fixed portfolio of assets), face amount installment certificate 
companies, and common trust funds.  Id. 
24. The effect of foreign, state and local, or transfer taxes on the development of mutual funds 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  It is interesting to note, however, that the heading of the 1924 
MIT offering circular reads “Tax Exempt in Massachusetts.”  The circular also touted the benefit 
of investing in MIT as opposed to holding shares directly in order to avoid state inheritance taxes.  
See FINK, supra note 18, at 12. 
25. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 23(p), 48 Stat. 680, 690–91 (allowing corporation 
deduction against net income for dividends from domestic corporations). 
26. Under section 25(a)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1934, individuals were permitted credits 
against their net income for purposes of the normal tax (but not surtax) for dividends from U.S. 
corporations.  The surtax applied to taxable incomes in excess of $4000 (approximately $65,000 
in 2010 dollars) was levied at a rate beginning at 4% and rising to 59% for taxable incomes in 
excess of $1,000,000.  See id. § 12(b) (listing rates of surtax). 
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whether an investor held stocks directly or indirectly through an 
investment company, dividends paid by the underlying companies 
would be subject to only one shareholder-level tax.  Although interest 
and capital gains earned by an investment company were subject to 
corporate tax, closed-end funds often issued debt, and the interest paid 
on such debt reduced a fund’s taxable income.  Also, many investment 
companies had losses or minimal gains because of the decline in stock 
prices from 1929 through 1933.27 
Investment companies organized as business trusts initially took the 
position that they would be subject to tax as trusts rather than 
associations, which are taxed liked corporations.  If an investment 
company were taxed as a trust, it could avoid entity-level taxes by 
paying out the trust’s income,28 and thus trust beneficiaries would avoid 
any entity-level tax.  Until 1935, there was some uncertainty as to 
whether investment companies organized as trusts would be taxable as 
trusts or corporations.  The Supreme Court settled this issue in 
Morrissey v. Commissioner, which upheld Treasury regulations 
classifying operating trusts as associations taxable as corporations.29  
Under these regulations, investment companies would be treated as 
operating trusts because their selection of investments or active 
management of portfolio companies would be treated as a trade or 
business. 
 
27. Capital losses could offset capital gains plus $2000 of other income.  Revenue Act of 
1936, ch. 689, § 117(d), 49 Stat. 1648, 1692; Revision of Revenue Laws Before the H. Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 75th Cong. 854–57 (1938) (statement of William T. Gardiner, Chairman, 
Incorporated Investors) (stating that corporate income tax is not a real burden because of 
availability of capital losses to offset realized capital gains).  The potential conflicts between 
senior and junior securities holders “compelled” open-end funds to operate with only a single 
class of shares or interests.  H.R. DOC. NO. 75-707, pt.1, at 101.  The amount of leverage 
employed by closed-end funds was not insubstantial.  According to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), in 1929, debt and preferred stock represented about 60% of the total 
capital and liabilities of leveraged closed-end funds.  For 1930–1934, the aggregate common 
equity of these funds was actually negative.  Id. pt. 2, at 140 tbl.33.  There were non-leveraged 
closed-end funds, although they were fewer in number and had fewer assets than the levered 
closed-end funds.  For example, in 1929, there were ninety-one leveraged funds with total AUM 
of $1.3 trillion, compared to thirty-two unleveraged funds with total AUM of $318 million.  Id. 
pt. 2, at 138 tbl.32. 
28. See Revenue Act of 1934 § 162(b) (allowing a trust to deduct amounts paid to 
beneficiaries). 
29. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).  A trust that merely held a fixed portfolio of securities for its 
beneficiaries and distributed the income from the portfolio but could not vary the composition of 
the portfolio would not be taxed as an “association.”  This distinction survives in the current 
entity classification regulations.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1) (2013) (defining investment 
trusts). 
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A. The Revenue Acts of 1935 and 1936 
In 1935, at President Roosevelt’s behest, Congress modified the 
taxation of intercompany dividends by providing for a corporate 
dividends received deduction of 90%—that is, 10% of the dividends 
received by a corporation would be subject to corporate tax.30 
Although Roosevelt had proposed exempting investment companies 
from the new tax on intercompany dividends, the final legislation did 
not provide for any specific relief for investment companies, and the 
corporate tax rate was raised from 13.75% to 15%.  Consequently, 
investment company shareholders now bore an additional level of 
corporate tax on dividends from portfolio companies in excess of the 
taxes to which they would have been subject had they directly owned 
the stock of the portfolio companies.  One mutual fund historian stated 
that investment companies feared being taxed out of existence.31  This 
seems to be a bit of hyperbole as the maximum effective tax rate on 
dividends with the 90% dividends received deduction was only 1.5%.32  
In any case, shareholders of investment companies, including those 
organized as trusts, now bore an additional level of corporate tax on 
dividends from portfolio companies that they would not have if they 
invested directly.  Also, because of stock market gains in the mid-
1930s, the corporate tax on capital gains was now economically 
meaningful.  The entity-level fiscal burden, however, would soon be 
alleviated. 
To provide relief for investment company shareholders from entity-
level taxation, Congress enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1936 
(“the ’36 Act”), the precursor to the current Subchapter M.33  The ’36 
 
30. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(h), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016 (amending section 23(p) of 
the Revenue Act of 1934, which permitted deduction for the amount of any dividends received by 
a corporation in computing corporate taxable income).  There was concern that the use of 
controlled multiple corporations could thwart the new graduated corporate tax rates enacted 
simultaneously with the reduced dividends received deduction.  Revenue Act of 1935: Hearing on 
H.R. 8974 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 74th Cong. 223–24 (1935) (statement of Robert Jackson, 
Assistant General Counsel, Treasury Department).  In addition, there was concern that holding 
company structures were being used to avoid tax on the consolidated income of the groups.  Roy 
G. Blakey & Gladys C. Blakey, Revenue Act of 1935, 25 AM. ECON. REV. 673, 683–84 (1935). 
31. FINK, supra note 18, at 26. 
32. The Revenue Act of 1935 amended corporate income tax rates so that the highest 
corporate tax rate was 15%.  Revenue Act of 1935 § 102(a).  With a 90% dividend received 
deduction, only 10% of any dividend is subject to tax with a resulting effective tax rate on 
dividends of 1.5%—10% of 15% is 1.5%. 
33. The behind-the-scenes actions of the representatives of open-end funds are engagingly 
detailed in Natalie R. Grow, The “Boston-Type Open-End Fund”—Development of a National 
Financial Institution: 1929–1940 (Apr. 30, 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University) (on file with author). 
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Act did not provide an outright income tax exemption for investment 
companies.  Instead, tax exemption for a mutual investment company 
was predicated on the company deriving at least 95% of its income from 
passive income—such as dividends, interest, gains from stock and 
securities—and distributing at least 90% of its net income as taxable 
dividends.34  In addition, an investment company could only invest up 
to 5% of its gross assets (based on historical cost) in the stock or 
securities of any one corporation (or government or political 
subdivision) and could not own more than 10% of the outstanding stock 
or securities (or both) of any one corporation.35  Any income retained 
by an investment company, however, would be subject to corporate 
income tax.  Finally, an investment company had to offer shareholders 
the right to redeem their shares at a value approximating NAV.36 
The diversification requirement imposed by the ’36 Act appears to 
have had various goals, and it has since remained a pillar of fund 
qualification both under the Internal Revenue Code and under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940.37  First, a diversified portfolio is 
generally less risky than an undiversified portfolio.  Thus, holding a 
portfolio of stocks is generally less risky than holding one, two, or a 
handful of stocks.38  The basic intuition is that an individual company is 
subject both to idiosyncratic risk—for example, a fire at a factory—and 
to general market risks—for example, a decline in demand due to a 
recession.  By increasing the number of companies in a portfolio, an 
investor lessens the effects of idiosyncratic risks, but still remains 
subject to market risk.39  Another goal of the diversification requirement 
 
34. To qualify as a mutual investment company, a corporation (including an investment trust) 
had to be organized for the purpose of investing in stock or securities, derive 95% or more of its 
gross income as passive income, derive less than 30% of its gross income from stock or securities 
held less than six months, and distribute annually 90% or more of its net income as taxable 
dividends.  Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 689, § 48(e)(1), 49 Stat. 1648, 1669. 
35. Id. § 48(e)(2).  The Revenue Act of 1936 also limited the amount of debt an investment 
company could issue to 10% of its gross assets (based on historical cost).  Id. 
36. Id. § 48(e)(1)(E).  A fund could impose a discount of up to 3%.  Id. 
37. See infra Part I.B (briefly describing the Investment Company Act of 1940). 
38. See, e.g., Meir Statman, How Many Stocks Make a Diversified Portfolio?, 22 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 353, 362 (1987) (showing that a well-diversified portfolio requires at 
least thirty to forty stocks). 
39. Correlation describes the relationship between stock returns of different companies and 
ranges from 1 to -1, with a correlation of 1 representing a perfect positive relationship and a 
correlation of -1 representing perfect decreasing linear relationship.  Under standard portfolio 
theory, provided that the correlation of the returns of the assets of a portfolio are less than 1, the 
standard deviation (risk) of a portfolio of assets is lower than the weighted average of the 
standard deviation of the portfolio assets, but the expected return of a portfolio of assets is equal 
to the weighted average of the expected returns of the assets.  Consequently, combining 
uncorrelated assets leads to reduction in risk in the portfolio without a corresponding reduction in 
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was to prevent mutual funds from becoming controlling investors in the 
companies whose shares they acquired.40 
Mutual investment companies computed their net or taxable income 
in the same manner as regular corporations, except that the dividends 
received deduction, which was lowered to 85% in the ’36 Act, did not 
apply to investment companies.41  That is, dividends received from 
other corporations were fully subject to corporate tax in the hands of 
mutual investment companies.  Instead, mutual investment companies, 
but not regular corporations, were permitted to deduct dividends 
received in the previous taxable year against net income dividends paid 
during the current taxable year.42 
The income, diversification, and distribution requirements of the ’36 
Act laid the foundation for the tax treatment of investment companies 
that in substantial measure continues today in Subchapter M.  One 
consequence of the ’36 Act changes was the conversion of income from 
portfolio investments into dividend income.  That is, a distribution 
received from an investment company was taxed as an ordinary 
dividend and did not reflect the tax character of the underlying income 
of the investment company.  For dividends and interest received by an 
investment company, a shareholder received, in essence, pass-through 
treatment.  For tax-exempt interest and capital gains, however, a 
shareholder of an investment company was potentially worse off by 
earning such income through an investment company because the 
character of the income was transformed from tax-exempt interest or 
capital gains to ordinary dividend income.43  Many of the subsequent 
changes in the taxation of investment companies were aimed at 
ameliorating this tax detriment by refining the pass-through treatment of 
investment company income. 
 
a portfolio’s expected return.  Diversification has long been recommended as a way to reduce 
investment risk.  For example, see Solomon’s admonition in Ecclesiastes: “Cast your bread upon 
the waters, for after many days you will find it again.  Give portions to seven, yes to eight, for 
you do not know what disaster may come upon the land.”  Ecclesiastes 11:1–2. 
40. See Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1469, 1475 (1991) (discussing purpose of diversification requirement). 
41. Revenue Act of 1936 § 13(a)(2) (no dividends received deduction (“DRD”) for mutual 
investment companies); id. § 26(b) (85% DRD for dividends from domestic corporations); id. § 
27 (dividends paid credit equal to amount of dividends paid during the taxable year). 
42. Id. § 13(a)(3).  The deduction for dividends paid during the year applied for purposes of 
both the regular corporate income tax and the surtax on undistributed profits.  Id. § 14(a)(2) 
(calculating tax based on surtax, undistributed net income, by subtracting from net income the 
credit for dividends paid under section 27). 
43. See id. § 22(b)(4) (excluding interest on state and municipal bonds from gross income); id. 
§ 117(a) (providing for an exemption for a certain percentage of capital gains ranging from 0% to 
70% depending on the taxpayer’s holding period). 
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One puzzle is why investment entities were not organized as general 
or limited partnerships.  If an investment company were organized as a 
partnership, the individual partners would be taxed on their share of the 
investment partnership’s income without any entity-level taxation, and 
the income would retain the same tax character in the hands of the 
partners as it had in the hands of the partnership.44  A general 
partnership would probably not be a suitable investment vehicle because 
of the potential for unlimited liability of the individual partners for the 
debts and obligations of the partnership (and possibly the ability of the 
individual partners to bind the partnership and participate in partnership 
governance).  A limited partnership, however, would eliminate the risk 
of unlimited liability for the limited partners (but not for the general 
partner) and prevent unwanted interference in partnership governance.  
At that time, however, limited partnerships were not widely employed, 
perhaps because of concerns over the potential scope of partner liability 
and other uncertainties regarding limited partner rights.45 
Because closed-end funds did not offer shareholders the right to 
redeem their shares, closed-end funds were subject to entity-level 
taxation but open-end funds were not.  This gave open-end funds a 
potential competitive advantage.46  A desire to eliminate this tax 
disadvantage has been proffered as one of the main reasons closed-end 
funds joined with open-end funds to support the legislation that would 
become the Investment Company Act of 1940.47 
B. The Investment Company Act of 1940 
Congress enacted the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“the ’40 
Act”) to address perceived abuses by investment companies, including 
inadequate disclosure, abusive transactions with related parties, opaque 
capital structures, shoddy accounting, and excessive leverage.48  The 
 
44. Representatives of certain investment companies urged Congress to apply the partnership 
theory of taxation to investment companies in the ’36 Act in order to treat investors equitably.  
Revenue Act, 1936: Hearing on H.R. 12395 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 74th Cong. 799–801 
(1936) (letter from Paul C. Cabot, President, State Street Investment Corporation and Merrill 
Griswold, Chairman of the Board, Massachusetts Investors Trust, to Sen. Walsh). 
45. See Comment, The Limited Partnership, 45 YALE L.J. 895, 902–04 (1936) (discussing 
limited partnerships under the Uniform Act and noting that limited partnerships offered few other 
advantages to investor looking for limited liability and a share of profits). 
46. The extent of this advantage would depend on several factors, including the difference 
between the corporate tax rate and individual tax rate, the amount of the DRD, the composition of 
a fund’s income (including dividend, capital gains, and tax-exempt interest income), and the 
treatment of losses. 
47. FINK, supra note 18, at 35. 
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1(b)(1)–(8) (2012) (stating findings and declaration of policy of the ’40 
Act).  The findings that led to the ’40 Act are found in SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON 
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’40 Act regulates, inter alia, the disclosure of a fund’s investment 
policies and objectives, the content of the investment advisory contract, 
dealings between a fund and its advisor, a fund’s capital and corporate 
structures, and restrictions on investments.  Enacted pursuant to the 
same findings that engendered the ’40 Act, the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940,49 regulates investment advisers, such as fund managers.50 
The ’40 Act regulates “investment companies,”51 the most important 
being “management companies.”52  An investment company can be 
either an “open-end company” or “closed-end company.”53  
Management companies are further classified as either “diversified” or 
“non-diversified.”54  These requirements were similar to the 
diversification requirements that a company had to satisfy in order to 
qualify as a mutual investment company for tax purposes.55 
The enactment of the ’40 Act brought both closed-end and open-end 
funds under the same regulatory regime, although special rules applied 
to each type of fund.56  Because closed-end funds supported the ’40 
Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in turn 
advocated extending to closed-end funds the same tax benefits 
 
INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R. DOC. NO. 75-707 (1939).  This report 
was commissioned by Congress in section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935. 
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–21. 
50. The leading treatise on the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is HARVEY E. BINES & 
STEVE THEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LAW AND REGULATION (2d ed. 2004). 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (defining investment company). 
52. Id. § 80a-4 (classifying investment companies as either “face-amount certificate 
company,” “unit investment trust,” or “management company”). 
53. Id. §§ 80a-5(a)(1)–(2). 
54. Id. §§ 80a-5(b)(1)–(2).  To qualify as diversified, a management company must ensure 
that at least 75% of its total assets are limited to any single issuer to an amount not greater than 
5% of the value of the total assets of the management company and not more than 10% of the 
outstanding voting stock of the issuer.  Id. § 80a-5(b)(1).  A company that is diversified can only 
become non-diversified if a majority of its shareholders assent.  Id. § 80a-13(a)(1). 
55. See Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, §§ 361(b)(1)–(2), 52 Sta. 447, 553.  The ’40 Act also 
imposed limits on the amount of leverage a fund can employ.  Open-end companies may not issue 
debt securities, but they can borrow directly from a bank to finance a portion of their portfolio 
purchases.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (requiring asset coverage of at least 300%).  Closed-end 
funds may issue debt securities and preferred stock under limited circumstances, in addition to 
borrowing from banks to fund portfolio purchases.  Id. § 80a-18(a)(1) (asserting that immediately 
after issuance of debt, a fund must have asset coverage of at least 300%); id. § 80a-18(a)(2) 
(asserting that immediately after issuance of preferred stock, a fund must have asset coverage of 
at least 200%).  One potential effect of limiting leverage, besides limiting the volatility and 
riskiness of the fund, is to limit interest deductions and thereby increase the investment 
company’s (and shareholders’) income. 
56. For example, closed-end and open-end funds are subject to different rules regarding the 
pricing and distribution of shares.  See, e.g., id. § 80a-22 (regulating distribution and pricing of 
shares of open-end funds). 
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previously accorded only to open-end funds.57  This occurred with the 
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942. 
C. The Revenue Act of 1942 
The Revenue Act of 1942 (“the ’42 Act”) established the modern 
statutory tax regime applicable to regulated investment companies.58  It 
also firmly established the link between the special mutual fund income 
tax regime and the new SEC rules.  To qualify as a RIC, an entity must 
be a U.S. corporation (including a trust taxed as a corporation) and must 
be registered under the ’40 Act as a management company or unit 
investment trust.59 
The ’42 Act also modified the prior income and diversification tests.  
In particular, to be a RIC, a corporation had to derive at least 90% 
(previously 95%) of its gross income from dividends, interest, and gains 
from the sale of stock or securities, and less than 30% of the gross 
income had to be earned from the sale of stock or securities held for 
three months or less.60  Under the new, slightly relaxed diversification 
rules, at least 50% of a RIC’s total assets at each quarter end had to 
consist of cash, government securities, securities of other RICs, and 
securities of other companies, but in making this determination, the 
securities of a single issuer were limited to 5% of the RIC’s total assets 
and not more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of the 
issuer.61  In addition, not more than 25% of a RIC’s total assets could be 
invested in a single issuer or two or more issuers that the RIC controlled 
and determined to be engaged in the same or similar trades or 
businesses.62  It should be noted that failing to satisfy the diversification 
tests of the ’40 Act merely meant that a fund could not advertise itself 
as being “diversified,” but failing to satisfy the RIC diversification 
 
57. FINK, supra note 18, at 34–37. 
58. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 170, 56 Stat. 798, 87–81 (originally codified at I.R.C. §§ 
361, 362 (1939) as amended in 1942). 
59. I.R.C. § 361(a) (1939) (as amended in 1942).  Common trust funds exempt from 
regulation under section 3(c)(3) of the ’40 Act are also eligible to be taxed as a RIC.  A common 
trust fund for these purposes is a fund maintained by a bank to collect and invest capital received 
in its capacity as a trustee, etc., in connection with fiduciary accounts such as trusts and estates. 
60. Id. §§ 361(b)(1)–(2).  The short-term trading limit was unchanged. 
61. Value is market value if available or fair value determined by the board of directors.  Id. § 
361(b)(3). 
62. Id.  The statute defines control to be ownership of 20% or more of the total combined 
voting power of all classes of voting stock.  Id.  The ’42 Act also enacted provisions to prevent a 
RIC from failing the diversification tests in a subsequent quarter solely because of appreciation or 
depreciation in the securities in its portfolio, including the possibility of adjusting its portfolio 
within thirty days of the quarter close.  Id. 
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requirements in the ’42 Act caused a fund to be subject to corporate tax 
on all its income (not reduced by dividends paid). 
The ’42 Act did not alter the requirement that a RIC distribute at least 
90% of its net income for the year to avoid corporate tax.  If the 
distribution requirement was met, a RIC was subject to the regular 
corporate tax on its adjusted net income, but adjusted net income was 
regular income reduced by dividends paid.63  In addition, the ’42 Act 
provided for the separate treatment of net capital gains (“NCGs”) for 
both RICs and RIC shareholders.  A RIC avoided tax on its NCGs by 
distributing them,64 and capital gain dividends received by a RIC 
shareholder were treated as long-term capital gains, regardless of the 
length of the shareholder’s holding period.65  A RIC thus avoided 
entity-level tax by distributing its adjusted net income and NCGs.66  
The separate treatment of NCGs was the initial step in moving the RIC 
regime towards a pass-through regime in which the character of RIC 
income carried over to its shareholders when distributed. 
The distribution requirement was not as burdensome for open-end 
funds as for closed-end funds because open-end funds could replenish 
capital continuously.  A closed-end fund, on the other hand, could not 
replenish capital as easily because raising capital required a costly share 
offering, and distributions thus inexorably lowered assets.  This, and the 
lack of a redemption privilege, may be why closed-end funds, although 
they have not disappeared, have been greatly eclipsed by open-end 
funds and more recently by exchange traded funds (“ETFs”).67 
D. Summary 
The ’42 Act established the RIC tax regime that continues largely 
unchanged seventy years later.  To avoid corporate tax, a RIC must 
adhere to the provisions of the ’40 Act, comply with certain 
 
63. Id. § 362(b)(1) (stating that tax base is adjusted net income excluding net capital gain 
minus the basic surtax credit of section 27(b), which is the sum of the dividends paid plus consent 
dividends).  Corporations were subject at this time to both a regular income tax and a surtax.  A 
RIC’s surtax base was its net income, excluding net capital gain, less dividends paid (other than 
capital gain dividends), plus consent dividends credit.  Id. § 362(b)(2). 
64. A RIC was subject to tax on the excess of net long-term capital gains over the sum of: (1) 
net short-term capital loss; and (2) capital gain dividends, which were dividends designated by a 
RIC as capital gain dividends.  Id. §§ 362(b)(5), (7). 
65. Id. § 362(b)(6). 
66. RICs were subject to special tax rates on undistributed income: 24% on surtax net income, 
16% on net income, and 25% on net capital gains.  Id. §§ 362(b)(3)–(5). 
67. Open-end RICs constitute 90% and closed-end funds constitute 1.8% of investment 
company total net assets.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 9 fig.1.1.  It was difficult for closed-
end funds to offer redemption privileges because of the changes in the ’40 Act that restricted 
redemptions by funds when the fund shares traded at a discount. 
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diversification requirements, and distribute most of its earnings.  The 
RIC tax regime thus imposes certain structural costs on RICs and their 
shareholders, such as the distribution requirement and the need to 
determine and track the tax character of a RIC’s income.  These 
distribution costs, however, are a function of a RIC’s taxable income, 
which the fund manager controls to some extent. 
II. SUBCHAPTER M 
This Part briefly reviews the current RIC tax regime.68  It does not 
delve into the intricacies of Subchapter M, but aims to highlight 
material changes since 1942 and focus on certain structural features that 
may generate tax externalities for tax-exempt and taxable 
shareholders.69 
A. RIC Qualification 
As under the Revenue Act of 1942, to qualify as a RIC, an entity 
must be a U.S. corporation that is a registered management company 
under the ’40 Act and must make an annual election to be a RIC.70  A 
RIC still must satisfy the 90% gross income test, but the types of 
income that count towards this test have been expanded to include not 
only dividends,71 interest (both taxable and tax-exempt), and gains from 
the sale of stock and securities,72 but also gains realized from foreign 
currencies, and derivatives based on stock or securities such as options, 
forwards, and futures.73  Income related to a RIC’s investment activities 
 
68. The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that address the taxation of mutual funds are 
found primarily in Subchapter M, Part I of the Code, sections 851 through 855. 
69. The leading modern tax treatise on RICs is SUSAN A. JOHNSTON & JAMES R. BROWN, JR., 
TAXATION OF REGULATED INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND THEIR SHAREHOLDERS (2012). 
70. I.R.C. § 851(a)(1)(A) (2012).  Unit investment trusts, business development companies, 
and certain common trust funds are also eligible to be RICs.  See id. §§ 851(a)(1)(B), (a)(2). 
71. Qualifying income also includes Subpart F inclusions under section 951(a)(1)(A)(i) and 
certain PFIC inclusions.  Id. § 851(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.851-2(b)(2) (2013). 
72. The definition of security for purposes of section 851(b)(2) is the same as security under 
section 2(a)(36) of the ’40 Act.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2012); I.R.C. § 851(b). 
73. I.R.C. § 851(b)(2)(A).  The net income from an interest in a qualified publicly traded 
partnership is also included.  Id. § 851(b)(2)(B).  This 2004 provision permits a RIC to include 
only the net income from a qualified publicly traded partnership for purposes of the income tax 
instead of having to include its proportionate share of the partnership’s tax items, which would 
occur in the case of an investment in a non-qualified partnership.  See id. § 851(b) (providing that 
income derived from a partnership or trust shall be treated as satisfying the 90% requirement only 
to the extent that such income is attributable to items of income of the partnership or trust).  The 
IRS has clarified in rulings that certain investments are “stock or securities” for purposes of 
section 851(b)(2).  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-177, 1974-1 C.B. 165 (clarifying that interests in REITs 
are stock or securities); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200846019 (Nov. 14, 2008) (holding that income 
from participating loan was qualifying income); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200602032 (Jan. 13, 2006) 
COLON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  10:41 PM 
2014] Oil and Water 789 
is also included as gross income under the test.74  The 30% limit on 
short-term trading gains was eliminated in 1997.75 
Before 2010, if an entity failed the 90% test, it would not qualify as a 
RIC and would be subject to corporate tax.  Under new section 851(i), 
an entity otherwise failing the 90% test will be treated as having 
satisfied the 90% test if the entity discloses each item of its gross 
income and the failure was due to reasonable cause not willful 
neglect.76  The RIC is also subject to tax on a portion of the non-
qualifying income.77 
 
(holding that income and gain from forwards, futures, and options on foreign currencies are 
qualifying income); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9012008 (Dec. 15, 1989) (holding that option on futures 
contract on U.S. government securities is “security”).  Since investments in commodities, such as 
grains, gold, and silver, are not securities under the ’40 Act, income and gain from such 
investments, including derivatives related to such commodities, do not constitute qualifying 
income.  Rev. Rul. 2006-1, 2006-1 C.B. 939 (holding that income from long notional principal 
contract in which RIC paid three-month Treasury bill rate plus any depreciation in commodity 
index and received any appreciation in commodity index was not qualifying income; contract not 
security and not entered into in connection with business of investing in stock, securities, or 
currencies), modified, Rev. Rul. 2006-31, 2006-1 C.B. 1133 (clarifying that Rev. Rul. 2006-1 was 
not intended to preclude conclusion that income from structured notes creating commodity 
exposure is qualifying income).  Income and gain from the sale of direct interests in real estate are 
not qualifying income, although direct ownership of real estate is not prohibited.  Rev. Rul. 85-
167, 1985-2 C.B. 178.  Interests in a REIT, however, constitute securities under section 
851(b)(2).  Rev. Rul. 74-177, 1974-1 C.B. 165 (holding that interests in REITs are stock or 
securities), modified, Rev. Rul. 89-81, 1989-1 C.B. 226 (holding that to the extent that 74-177 
approves non-proportionate designations of particular types of income, it is not a proper 
interpretation of law).  The 90% gross income limit is not strictly binding as it can be easily 
avoided through the use of a so-called “blocker” foreign corporation.  A RIC that may run afoul 
of the 90% gross income limit because of commodity related income could form a wholly owned 
foreign corporation and have the foreign corporation make the commodity investments.  To the 
extent that such income is treated as Subpart F income, it would be qualifying income for 
purposes of the 90% test.  Under section 851(b)(2), Subpart F inclusions from a controlled 
foreign corporation (“CFC”) are treated as dividends (good income), even if the underlying 
income by the CFC would not otherwise be qualifying income.  I.R.C. § 851(b)(2).  The IRS has 
issued numerous private letter ruling blessing these structures.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
201129002 (Apr. 8, 2011) (defining CFC’s Subpart F income as qualifying income under section 
815(b)(2)).  See generally Willard B. Taylor, “Blockers,” “Stoppers,” and the Entity 
Classification Rules, 64 TAX LAW. 1 (2010).  The investment in a CFC would be subject to the 
25% diversification tests. 
74. I.R.C. § 851(b)(2)(A).  This provision ensures that items such as litigation recoveries, 
income tax refunds, and payments from investment advisors constitute qualifying income.  See, 
e.g., Rev. Rul. 92-56, 1992-2 C.B. 153 (holding that reimbursement from investment advisor is 
qualifying income). 
75. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 787 (codified as amended at 
I.R.C. § 851). 
76. I.R.C. § 851(i)(1).  This provision, enacted as part of the Regulated Investment Company 
Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-325, is effective for post December 22, 2010 tax years.  
The government has not issued any guidance on the scope of the reasonable cause exception 
under section 851.  Some practitioners look to how it has been interpreted under the REIT rules.  
See Treas. Reg. § 1.856-7(c)(1) (explaining that failure to meet an income source requirement 
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In addition to the gross income test, a RIC must also satisfy, at 
quarter end, two diversification tests: the 50% and 25% tests.78  These 
tests are identical to the diversification tests of the Revenue Act of 
1942, except that not more than 25% of a RIC’s total assets can be 
invested in the securities of one or more publicly traded partnerships.79 
For both diversification tests, value is the market value if a market 
quotation is available.80  As under the Revenue Act of 1942, RICs 
continue to be protected against failing the diversification test due to 
subsequent changes in value of their investments.81 
B. The Taxation of RICs 
The current RIC tax regime largely follows the regime enacted in 
1935 and modified in 1942.  The most significant changes relate to the 
expansion of the categories of RIC income that retain their tax character 
in the hands of RIC shareholders. 
To qualify as a RIC, an entity is required to distribute at least 90% of 
the sum of: (1) investment company taxable income (“ICTI”) 
(determined without regard to the dividends paid deduction);82 and (2) 
tax-exempt interest (less disallowed deductions attributable to the tax-
exempt interest).83  If the 90% test is satisfied, a RIC may deduct 
 
will be considered reasonable cause, not willful neglect, if REIT exercised ordinary business care 
and prudence); Lee A. Sheppard, Continuing Problems for Mutual Funds Despite RIC Mod, 138 
TAX NOTES 1029, 1030 (2013) (“RIC Mod[ernization Act] significantly reduced the chances of a 
RIC losing RIC status by instituting intermediate sanctions for unintentional failure of the asset 
test . . . or gross income test . . . .”). 
77. The tax applies to the excess of income from non-qualifying sources over one-ninth of the 
gross income of the RIC that is from qualifying sources.  I.R.C. § 851(i)(2).  Any tax paid is 
deductible in computing a RIC’s ICTI.  Id. § 852(b)(2)(G). 
78. Id. § 851(b)(3). 
79. Id. § 851(b)(3)(B)(iii). 
80. Id. § 851(c)(4).  If there is no market quotation available, value is “fair value,” as 
determined by the RIC’s board of directors.  Id. 
81. Id. § 851(d)(1) (stating that a RIC will not fail a diversification test solely as a result of 
changes in the market value of a portfolio from one quarter to the next, unless the diversification 
test is not satisfied immediately after the acquisition of any security and is partly or wholly the 
result of such acquisition).  Furthermore, a RIC has up to thirty days to cure any failure to satisfy 
the diversification requirement resulting from intra-quarter acquisitions.  Id.  The regulations 
clarify that distributions will not cause a RIC to otherwise fail to satisfy the diversification test.  
Id. § 851(d); see Treas. Reg. § 1.851-5 ex.5.  A RIC that otherwise fails the diversification test 
will be treated as satisfying it if the failure was due to reasonable cause or was considered to be 
de minimis and corrected with six months.  I.R.C. §§ 851(d)(2)(A)–(B).  If the failure is not de 
minimis, a RIC may be subject to an excise tax.  Id. § 851(d)(2)(C). 
82. ICTI is corporate taxable income but excluding any NCG and without allowance for any 
net operating loss (“NOL”) carryover or carryback and the deduction for dividends received.  Id. 
§§ 852(b)(1), (b)(2)(A)–(C). 
83. Id. § 852(a)(1). 
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dividends paid to shareholders against its ICTI, thereby avoiding 
corporate tax on ICTI.84 
Net short-term capital gains are included in ICTI, but their character 
as net short-term capital gains does not pass through to shareholders 
when distributed.  This is disadvantageous to an individual RIC 
shareholder that has capital losses it cannot use otherwise, because the 
RIC dividend cannot be offset by the capital losses.85 
Although net short-term capital gains (less any net long-term losses) 
are included in ICTI, NCGs are carved out of ICTI, and a RIC is taxed 
on the excess of its NCGs over the deduction for capital gain dividends 
paid.86  Thus, a RIC that pays out all of its ICTI and NCGs avoids 
entity-level taxation.87 
Tax-exempt interest does not constitute ICTI (though it is qualifying 
income), but such interest is included in the amount that must be 
distributed for an entity to qualify as a RIC.88  When tax-exempt interest 
is distributed by a RIC, it retains its tax character, provided that the RIC 
is eligible to pay exempt-interest dividends.89  A RIC is eligible to pay a 
 
84. Id. § 852(b)(2)(D).  The deduction for dividends paid is determined under section 561(a).  
In general, only distributions from current or accumulated earnings and profits (“E&Ps”) 
constitute “dividends” for this purpose.  Id. §§ 561(a)(1), 562(a).  Dividends declared in the last 
three months of the year are treated as paid on December 31, provided the dividends are paid in 
January of the following year.  Id. § 852(b)(7).  Pursuant to section 855, certain dividends 
declared after October 15 of the close of the taxable year and paid within the twelve-month period 
following the close of the taxable year (so called “spillback” dividends) are treated for purposes 
of the distribution requirement, ICTI, and NCG, as having been paid in the prior year.  Id. § 
855(a).  Finally, a RIC can avoid corporate tax by paying a deficiency dividend.  See id. § 860 
(“If a determination with respect to any qualified investment entity results in any adjustment for 
any taxable year, a deduction shall be allowed to such entity for the amount of deficiency 
dividends for purposes of determining the deduction for dividends paid . . . for such year.”).  An 
exhaustive treatment of the intricacies of the dividend deduction is found in JOHNSTON & 
BROWN, supra note 69, ¶¶ 3.03–3.06. 
85. To the extent that a RIC dividend consists of “qualified dividends” it has received, the 
dividend will be a “qualified dividend” under section 1(h)(11) and thus taxed at a maximum rate 
of 20% in the hands of an individual shareholder.  I.R.C. § 854(b)(1)(B). 
86.  Id. § 852(b)(3)(A).  In calculating NCG, a RIC can elect to push to the following year any 
net capital loss or net long-term capital loss realized after October 31 of the taxable year.  Id. § 
852(b)(8). 
87. Capital gain dividends can be paid during the taxable year, but can also be paid in the 
succeeding year as a “spillback” dividend pursuant to an election under section 855.  Also, in the 
case of an adjustment to a RIC’s taxable income in a subsequent year arising from a court 
decision, an agreement with the IRS arising from an audit, or a statement on an amended return, 
the RIC can eliminate any tax deficiency by paying a deficiency dividend.  See id. § 860 (defining 
a deficiency dividend as a distribution of property made by the qualified investment entity).  If the 
gains are small or a fund wishes to retain assets, the distribution costs may exceed the corporate 
tax with respect to the NCGs, and it may therefore not be efficient to distribute the NCGs. 
88. Id. §§ 851(b), 852(a)(1)(B). 
89. Id. § 852(b)(5)(B).  Under a 2010 amendment to section 852(c)(1)(B)(i), the E&Ps of a 
RIC, which generally are not reduced by any amount not allowable as a deduction, may be 
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tax-exempt dividend if at the close of each quarter at least 50% of the 
RIC’s assets are tax-exempt obligations.90  As a result of this rule, tax-
exempt interest will generally be paid only by funds that exclusively 
hold tax-exempt bonds. 
ICTI is generally computed under normal corporate tax rules with 
certain adjustments,91 including special rules for capital losses:92 the 
excess of net short-term capital losses (“STCLs”) over net long-term 
capital gains (“LTCGs”) is treated as a STCL in the succeeding year, 
and the excess of any net long-term capital losses (“LTCLs”) over net 
short-term capital gains (“STCGs”) is treated as a LTCL in the 
succeeding year.93  There is no limit on the number of taxable years a 
net capital loss (“NCL”) can be carried forward.94 
In addition to the Subchapter M distribution requirements, section 
4982 imposes a nondeductible 4% excise tax on a RIC unless it 
distributes each calendar year 98% of the RIC’s ordinary income;95 plus 
98.2% of the RIC’s capital gain net income96 for the one-year period 
ending on October 31.97  The purpose of section 4982 is to penalize 
 
reduced by amounts not deductible under sections 265 (disallowance of interest incurred to carry 
tax-exempt bonds) and 171(a)(2) (amortizable bond premium relating to tax-exempt interest).  
This change prevents RICs that hold tax-exempt bonds from having E&Ps solely as a result of 
these disallowed expenses. 
90. Id. § 852(b)(5).  Tax-exempt interest of a RIC that is not eligible to pay a tax-exempt 
dividend will generate E&Ps in the hands of the RIC and distribution of such amounts will 
constitute a taxable dividend to RIC shareholders. 
91. Id. §§ 852(b)(2)(A)–(G). 
92. Generally, a corporation can only use a capital loss to the extent of its capital gains.  Any 
excess capital loss is generally treated as a capital loss carryback to the three preceding taxable 
years and then to the five succeeding years.  Id. §§ 1212(a)(1)(A)–(B).  A capital loss cannot be 
carried back to a year if the carryback would increase or produce a net operating loss.  Id. § 
1212(a)(1)(A)(ii).  Any carryforward or carryback is treated as a short-term capital loss.  Id. § 
1212(a)(1). 
93. Id. § 1212(a)(3).  This rule, which follows the treatment of capital losses for individuals, 
was revised in 2010.  Prior to the 2010 revisions, a RIC could carryforward a capital loss for only 
eight years, and it was treated as a STCL.  I.R.C. § 1212(a)(1)(C) (2006).  Treating capital loss 
carryforwards as short-term capital losses is generally favorable to RIC taxable shareholders: 
since short-term losses first offset short-term gains, a RIC would have potentially more long-term 
capital gains to pass through to shareholders. 
94. In addition, prohibiting a RIC from carrying back a capital loss obviates the need for RIC 
shareholders to file amended returns. 
95. Ordinary income for purposes of section 4982 is calendar year ICTI, computed without 
regard to any capital gains or losses and the dividends paid deduction.  I.R.C. § 4982(e)(1) 
(2012). 
96. Capital gain net income is the excess of capital gains over capital losses, reduced (but not 
below net capital gain) by a RIC net ordinary loss for the calendar year.  Id. §§ 4982(e)(2)(A)–
(B). 
97. Id. §§ 4982(a)–(b)(1).  This amount is increased by prior year shortfalls and decreased for 
prior year over-distributions.  Id. §§ 4982(b)(2)–(c)(2).  If a RIC has a taxable year that ends on 
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RICs that defer distributing taxable income.98  If a RIC invests in other 
entities, however, such as another RIC, a REIT, or partnership, it may 
be difficult to avoid the excise tax because the RIC may not receive in 
time the requisite tax information to calculate the required distribution.  
The section 4982 excise tax does not apply to a RIC, however, if at all 
times during the calendar year each shareholder was a trust described in 
section 401(a), which is exempt from tax under section 501(a).99 
Unlike partnerships and S corporations, RICs cannot pass through 
expenses in excess of ICTI or net capital losses.  Instead, these tax 
attributes remain at the corporate level.  The presence of these 
corporate-level attributes potentially affects tax-exempt shareholders 
because fund managers may view these attributes as wasting assets—to 
the extent that they are not used, their present value declines.  
Consequently, a fund manager may have the incentive to accelerate 
income or gain, for example, by selling assets with built-in gains, to 
extinguish these tax attributes as soon as possible.  Sales that are 
undertaken solely to reduce net operating losses (“NOLs”) or capital 
loss carryovers generate costs that are borne by tax-exempt 
shareholders, but provide no direct benefit.100 
C. The Taxation of RIC Shareholders 
A distribution received by a taxable RIC shareholder constitutes a 
dividend to the extent that it is attributable to either a RIC’s current or 
accumulated E&Ps.101  A dividend will be a qualified dividend subject 
 
November 30 or December 31, it can elect to calculate its capital gain net income by using its 
taxable year.  Id. § 4982(e)(4).  The excise tax and Subchapter M distribution regimes are 
somewhat distinct in their time coverage.  Under section 852, a RIC must comply with the 
distribution requirements for its taxable year, whereas section 4982 generally requires 
distributions to be made based on the calendar year.  Id. §§ 852, 4982.  The calculations (and 
required distributions) will thereby be different. 
98. See JOHNSTON & BROWN, supra note 69, ¶ 4.03. 
99. I.R.C. § 4982(f).  Section 4982(f) was added in 1988.  An Act to Make Technical 
Corrections to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1006(I)(6), 102 Stat. 3342 
(1988).  Section 4982(f) was amended in 2010, to extend the exemption beyond insurance 
company accounts and section 401(a) trusts.  Regulated Investment Company Modernization Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-325, § 401(a), 124 Stat. 3537.  The legislative history to the 2010 
amendments describes the reason for the changes: “RICs, in which all shareholders are section 
401(a) trusts or segregated accounts underlying insurance contracts, are not subject to the annual 
RIC excise tax because these shareholders would not benefit from deferring tax through a RIC.”  
Regulated Investment Company Modernization Act of 2010, H.R. 4337, 111th Cong. (2010).  At 
least one fund has taken advantage of this tax provision.  Transamerica Index Funds, Inc., Annual 
Report (Form N-CSR) (Mar. 4, 2004) (making no provision for excise taxes, regardless of the 
amount of distributions). 
100. See infra Part IV.B (explaining how fund managers change their investment strategy 
based on the tax-exempt status of shareholders). 
101. I.R.C. § 311. 
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to a maximum tax rate of 20%102 to the extent that a RIC designates the 
dividend as being a qualified dividend.103 
An individual RIC shareholder who receives a capital gain dividend 
can treat the capital gain dividend as a long-term capital gain, which is 
currently taxed at a maximum rate of 20%.104  Likewise, exempt 
interest dividends are treated as tax-exempt interest under section 103. 
Although losses and expenses of a RIC are not passed through to its 
shareholders, if more than 50% of the total value of a RIC’s assets at 
year-end is made up of foreign stock or securities, the RIC can make an 
election under section 853 to enable its shareholders to credit foreign 
taxes paid by the RIC under section 901.105  If a RIC makes the section 
853 election, it grosses up the dividends paid deduction by the amount 
of foreign taxes, and the RIC shareholders must include the amount of 
foreign taxes paid by the RIC in their income.106 
For corporate shareholders, a RIC can designate an amount of its 
dividends received as being eligible for the dividends received 
deduction.107  The corporate shareholder is also subject to the same 
 
102. See id. § 1(h)(11)(B) (defining qualified dividend income). 
103. Id. § 854(b)(1)(B).  If the qualified dividend income of a RIC is 95% or more of a RIC’s 
gross income (as specially defined), then the entire amount of the dividend will be a qualified 
dividend.  Id. § 854(b)(1)(B)(iii).  A RIC may designate an amount as a qualified dividend 
generally to the extent that a RIC has received qualified dividend income.  Id. § 854(b)(1)(C)(ii).  
Notice 2004-39 sets forth special rules for applying the differing tax rates in section 1(h) to the 
capital gains dividends paid by RICs and REITs.  I.R.S. Notice 2004–39, 2004–22 I.R.B. 982.  
The amount designated as a qualified dividend may also not exceed the aggregate dividends 
received by a RIC.  I.R.C. § 854(b)(1)(C)(i). 
104. Id. § 852(b)(3)(B).  A capital gain dividend is a dividend reported by the company in a 
written statement, such as a Form 1099, to its shareholders.  Id. § 852(b)(3)(C)(i).  A RIC 
shareholder must also include in income any undistributed capital gains (limited to the amount the 
shareholder would have received if all capital gains subject to tax had been distributed to the 
RIC’s shareholders at the close of its taxable year).  Id. § 852(b)(3)(D)(i).  In such case, the 
shareholder is deemed to have paid the corporate tax paid by the RIC and can receive a credit for 
such taxes.  If a RIC has multiple classes of stock, any capital gains, tax-exempt interest, or 
foreign tax credit designation must be made in proportion to the dividends paid on each class.  
Rev. Rul. 89-81, 1989-1 C.B. 226. 
105. I.R.C. § 853(a)(1).  The RIC must also satisfy the distribution requirements of section 
852(a).  See id. § 853(a)(2).  A RIC can also pass through to its shareholders credits from certain 
bonds, such as qualified tax credit bonds and Build America bonds.  See id. § 853A. 
106. Id. § 853(b)(1).  The RIC shareholders also are permitted to treat as foreign source 
income the proportionate share of taxes and proportionate share of dividends paid by the RIC.  Id. 
§ 853(b)(2).  For a RIC that pays foreign taxes, but does not make the 853 election, it may either 
credit the foreign taxes against its ICTI under section 901 and 904 or deduct the foreign taxes 
under section 164.  The regulations clarify that taxes deemed paid under section 902 are not 
eligible for the section 853 election. 
107. Id. §§ 854(b)(1)(C)(i), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3).  The aggregate dividends include only dividends 
received from U.S. corporations that would be eligible for the dividends received deduction after 
application of sections 246 (minimum holding periods) and 246A (limitation on debt-financed 
dividends).  Id. § 854(b)(2).  For these purposes, dividends do not include distributions from 
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requirements under sections 243 and 246A as the RIC, and dividends 
received from a RIC are subject to the 70% dividends received 
deduction regardless of the corporate shareholder’s ownership of the 
RIC or the RIC’s ownership of the underlying dividend paying stock.108 
RIC distributions are generally taxable in the year in which they are 
received, but in some circumstances, distributions in a subsequent year 
are treated as if they were paid in the prior year, for purposes of both 
shareholder taxation and calculation of a RIC’s ICTI (and excise tax).109  
These provisions allow a RIC extra time in which to compute ICTI and 
ensure the distribution requirements have been satisfied. 
When a RIC realizes a taxable income or gain, it is taxed to the 
shareholders who actually receive (or are treated as having received)110 
the distribution of ICTI or NCGs.111  The income or gain, however, 
could have economically accrued long before the shareholders who 
receive distributions became shareholders.  A RIC shareholder could 
have paid for the accrued gain when he purchased shares of the RIC, 
 
certain tax-exempt entities or REITs.  Id. § 854(b)(3)(B). 
108. Id. § 854(b)(1)(A). 
109. Under section 852(b)(7), if a dividend declared in October, November, or December of 
any calendar year, is payable to shareholders of record on a specified date in one of the months, 
and received in January of the following year, the dividend is deemed to have been received on 
December 31 of the prior year.  Id. § 852(b)(7).  Under section 855, if a RIC declares a dividend 
prior to its return filing date (including extensions) and distributes the dividend within twelve 
months following the close of the taxable year, but no later than the date of the first dividend 
payment or the same kind of dividend distribution, the RIC can elect on its return to treat the 
dividend as having been paid during the prior taxable year.  Id. § 855(a).  The dividend is still 
treated for tax purposes as having been received by the shareholder in the year of distribution.  Id. 
§ 855(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.855-1(c) (2013).  This provision permits a RIC to ensure that it has 
complied with the distribution requirement and also is effective for purposes of computing ICTI, 
capital gains dividends, and tax-exempt interest dividends, but is not effective in reducing the 
section 4982 excise tax.  The one-year deferral permitted by section 855 has been curtailed by the 
enactment of the section 4982 excise tax.  I.R.C. § 4982(c)(3).  Under section 860, in the case of 
an adjustment to a RIC’s taxable income in a subsequent year arising from a court decision, 
agreement with the IRS arising from an audit, or a statement on an amended return, the RIC can 
eliminate any tax deficiency by paying a deficiency dividend.  Id. § 860(a).  For a detailed 
discussion of these provisions, see JOHNSTON & BROWN, supra note 69, ¶¶ 3.03–3.06, 4.03. 
110. Under section 852, a RIC shareholder will be treated as having received undistributed 
capital gains dividends (and paid tax on such gains) designated by the RIC in a notice to the 
shareholder within sixty days of the close of its tax year.  I.R.C. § 852(b)(3)(D)(i). 
111. In contrast, under Subchapter K, the allocation of built-in gains or losses to new partners 
is curtailed by section 704(c).  See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(4) (requiring the allocation 
of any built-in gain or loss under the principles of section 704(c) in the case of a revaluation of 
the partner’s capital accounts upon a capital contribution by a new or existing partner).  In the 
case of a sale of a partnership interest, if the partnership has a section 754 election in effect, the 
basis of the partnership property is adjusted with respect to the purchasing partner under section 
743.  I.R.C. §§ 743, 754.  In certain circumstances, these adjustments are mandatory.  See id. §§ 
704(c)(1)(C), 743(d)(1).  These rules and their potential application to RICs are discussed infra 
Part V.B. 
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which would be reflected in the RIC’s NAV, and when the gain is 
realized and distributed, he would be taxed on this gain again.  When 
the gain is distributed, the RIC’s NAV will decline, but this will provide 
no benefit to the shareholder until the shareholder sells the shares.  
Therefore, shareholders who receive distributions attributable to pre-
acquisition gains in essence have their tax liabilities temporarily 
accelerated. 
Because a new taxable shareholder can be taxed on a fund’s gains 
that have accrued before the shareholder invested, taxable shareholders 
appear to be sensitive to the amount of a fund’s tax overhang—the 
amount of a fund’s total unrealized gains.  There is evidence that fund 
managers manage a fund’s overhang by strategically realizing gains and 
losses.  Thus, even though tax-exempt shareholders do not pay tax on 
RIC distributions, they potentially bear their share of tax externalities 
caused by manager actions to manage overhang, ICTI, and NCG.112  
This has potentially detrimental consequences to shareholders, 
especially tax-exempt shareholders.113 
Managers have some control over a RIC’s ICTI and generally 
significant control over its NCG, and consequently, the tax liability of a 
RIC’s taxable shareholders.  When taxable shareholders predominate, 
managers appear to attempt to minimize overhang, ICTI, and NCG.  
When tax-exempt shareholders predominate, however, managers may 
actually become less concerned with minimizing overhang, ICTI, and 
NCG.114 
D. Summary 
A RIC generally avoids entity level-taxation by distributing its ICTI 
and NCGs, but its taxable shareholders are taxed on distributed income.  
Certain categories of income realized by a RIC retain their character 
when distributed, for example NCGs and tax-exempt interest—but a 
RIC, unlike a partnership and an S corporation, cannot pass through 
NOLs and net capital losses.  These items remain corporate-level tax 
attributes and can be used to reduce future ICTI or NCG.115  The RIC 
 
112. See, e.g., Michael Barclay, Neil D. Pearson & Michael S. Weisbach, Open-End Mutual 
Funds and Capital-Gains Taxes, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 30, 33 (1998) (finding evidence that 
managers reduce overhang to attract new investors). 
113. See infra Part IV.C–D. 
114. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the tax externalities suffered by taxable investors because 
of the presence of tax-exempt investors). 
115. If a RIC were organized as a partnership or S corporation, the entity’s expenses would 
generally constitute trade or business expenses (assuming the fund is a trader fund) and would be 
deductible without limit under section 162.  Note, if the entity had issued debt, the interest 
expense of a limited partner that does not materially participate in the trader fund’s activities 
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tax regime can be characterized as a partial or quasi pass-through 
regime, because not all of a RIC’s income, gains, losses, or deductions 
pass through to its shareholders or retain their character when 
distributed. 
As discussed below, the presence of these corporate-level tax 
attributes may cause fund managers to engage in trades that maximize 
the present value of these attributes, but that otherwise provide no value 
to tax-exempt shareholders.  In addition, implementing the requirements 
of the RIC partial pass-through regime requires an expensive tax 
accounting operation to classify and track the underlying income and 
also to ensure compliance with the income and distribution 
requirements.  It seems clear that none of these requirements benefit 
tax-exempt shareholders, but tax-exempt shareholders bear their share 
of these costs. 
Gains of a RIC are allocated to the shareholders of record in the year 
the gains are realized and distributed, even though the gains may have 
accrued before the shareholders of record became shareholders.  New 
shareholders may have to pay tax on these gains even though their 
shares have not increased in value (or may have even decreased in 
value) since they purchased them.  Such shareholders will see their tax 
liability accelerated, at least until they sell their shares.  Because new 
shareholders consider a fund’s overhang when deciding whether to 
purchase shares, fund managers monitor their funds’ overhang and 
appear to take actions to reduce it by, for example, realizing losses to 
offset gains.  The costs of these actions are borne by all shareholders, 
but provide benefits only for taxable shareholders. 
III. TAX-EXEMPT INVESTORS AND MUTUAL FUNDS 
The contours of the current RIC tax regime were largely established 
in the Revenue Act of 1942.116  From the 1940s through the early 
1960s, mutual fund shareholders consisted almost exclusively of U.S. 
taxable individuals.  With the creation of tax-exempt retirement plans 
for self-employed persons in 1962, however, mutual funds began for the 
first time to cater to and receive investments from self-directed, 
qualified retirement plans.  A common characteristic of all qualified 
 
would be subject to the investment interest limitation of section 163(d), but the interest expense 
allowed under section 163(d) would be deductible in determining the partner’s adjusted gross 
income.  See Rev. Rul. 2008-38, 2008-2 C.B. 249 (addressing whether interest expenses 
attributable to indebtedness are attributable to property held for investment).  Losses would retain 
their character and would be deductible by the owner, subject to the rules applicable to capital 
losses. 
116. See supra Part I.C. 
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retirement plans (and other deferred compensation arrangements such as 
IRAs) is the exemption of income and gains realized from plan 
investments from current tax.117  Thus, the tax character and timing of 
investment returns are irrelevant because the account or plan is 
generally tax-exempt.118 
The tax-exempt investors began entering into mutual funds with the 
enactment of provisions authorizing the creation of retirement plans 
(known as “Keogh” or “H.R. 10 plans”) for self-employed persons in 
1962.119  Keogh plans were permitted to invest in mutual funds because 
of a provision in the enabling legislation that specifically provided that 
bank custodial accounts invested solely in open-end mutual funds were 
one of the permissible funding recipients for Keogh plans.120 
In establishing these new plans, Congress appears to have wanted to 
provide Keogh plan beneficiaries with the option of investing in the 
U.S. equity market in addition to the less risky choices of insurance 
company annuities, endowment, and life insurance contracts.  Congress 
specifically did not offer Keogh plan beneficiaries the option of 
investing directly in individual shares or bonds of U.S. companies, but 
only in diversified, open-end RICs.121  It appears that Congress believed 
that the statutory diversification requirements imposed on RICs under 
 
117. See I.R.C. § 408(e); id. § 501(a).  In certain circumstances, however, it is possible for a 
qualified retirement plan to be subject to unrelated business income tax (“UBIT”).  See id. § 511.  
The UBIT provisions are beyond the scope of this Article. 
118. With the exception of Roth IRAs and Roth 401(k) plans, distributions from qualified 
plans are taxed as ordinary income to the plan beneficiary when distributed.  See id. §§ 72(a), 
402(a)(1); id. §§ 403(a)(1), 408(d).  Because contributions to Roth IRAs and Roth 401(k) plans 
are not deductible, qualified distributions from Roth IRAs are exempt from tax.  Id. § 408A(c)(1); 
id. § 408A(d)(1).  Earnings of Roth plans, however, are exempt from tax.  Id. § 408A(a).  For an 
overview of current retirement savings plans, see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-32-12, 
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE TAX TREATMENT OF RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS (2012) (providing a summary of the applicable retirement savings arrangements and the 
various economic issues relating to retirement plans). 
119. Self Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 
(codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.); see FINK, supra note 18, at 112–16.  Before the 
enactment of Keogh plans, the only retirement plans available to individuals were defined benefit 
plans and a small universe of defined contribution plans administered by bank and insurance 
companies, neither of which generally invested in mutual funds.  FINK, supra note 18, at 111. 
120. I.R.C. § 401(f)(1) (1970) (treating certain custodial accounts invested solely in open-end 
RICs as qualified trusts).  Other permissible funding methods for Keogh plans included annuities, 
endowment, or life insurance policies, and contributions to a trust with a bank (or similar 
institution) as trustee.  The same provision also applied to custodial accounts of qualified 
retirement plans of corporations. 
121. It is not clear why Congress determined that shares of closed-end RICs were 
impermissible investments.  It may have been because of the discounts and premiums to NAV 
that occasionally arise with closed-end fund shares.  The statute would be amended to permit 
investment in shares of closed-end RICs.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 
401, 29 U.S.C. § 1022(d) (2012). 
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both the Internal Revenue Code and ’40 Act provided a minimal level 
of protection for equity investments.  Congress’s focus on the 
diversification benefits of RICs would continue over the next couple of 
decades. 
As contribution limits were raised over the next two decades,122 the 
number of Keogh plans and Keogh plan assets increased significantly.  
By 1980, there were 225,000 plans with assets of $3.8 billion, and 
mutual funds held 40% of Keogh plan assets.123 
Keogh plans were the first qualified retirement savings plans for self-
employed persons, but over the next fifteen years Congress enacted a 
host of additional employee and non-employee retirement plans.  IRAs 
were introduced in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”) in 1974.124  IRAs were originally intended to provide a tax-
favored retirement savings plan for employees who were not otherwise 
covered by a qualified retirement plan.125  Importantly, the enabling 
legislation specifically provided that IRAs could be invested in the same 
assets that were acceptable for qualified plans, including stock of 
mutual funds, and that certain entities other than banks, including 
mutual funds, could serve as IRA custodians.126  In the same legislation, 
Congress permitted custodial accounts invested in RIC stock to be 
treated as annuity contracts in retirement plans of nonprofits entities, so-
called 403(b) plans.127  Prior to this change, 403(b) plans could only 
invest in insurance company annuities.128  The 403(b) RIC language 
tracked the RIC investment provisions for Keogh plans. 
Since 1974, Congress expanded the IRA family to include Roth 
IRAs,129 Coverdell Education Savings Accounts (formally “Education 
 
122. By 1982, Keogh plans were subject to the same limitations as corporate plans.  FINK, 
supra note 18, at 114. 
123. Id. at 115. 
124. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 2002(b). 
125. H.R. REP. NO. 93-807 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4699. 
126. See Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(e) (2013) (describing rules for non-bank trustee). 
127. I.R.C. § 403(b)(7) (2012) (amounts paid to a custodial accounts that invests in RIC stock 
is treated as a contribution for an annuity contract) (enacted in Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act § 1022(e)).  The legislative history states the expansion of permissible funding 
vehicles for 403(b) plans was made to provide “more flexibility.”  H.R. REP. NO. 93-807 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4827.  The statute was amended two years later to permit 
investment in closed-end funds.  Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1504(a), 90 Stat. 
1520, 1738. 
128. I.R.C. § 403(b)(1) (purchase of annuity contract by an employer described in section 
501(c)(3) for employee is excluded from gross income of employee). 
129. Id. § 408A (enacted in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 302, 111 
Stat. 788).  Roth IRAs were created in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.  Id.  Unlike traditional 
IRAs, a contribution to a Roth IRA is not deductible, but both the earnings of and distributions 
from a Roth IRA are generally tax-exempt.  Id. § 408A(a) (stating that Roth IRA treated in same 
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IRAs”),130 Simple IRAs,131 Simplified Employee Pension (“SEP”) 
IRAs,132 and Salary Reduction Simplified Employee Pension Plan 
(“SARSEP”) IRAs.133  Although eligibility requirements, maximum 
allowable contributions, deductibility of contributions, and taxation of 
distributions of each of the above IRAs vary slightly, they all share a 
common characteristic: their current earnings are tax-exempt.134 
ERISA imposes fiduciary duty standards on qualified plan 
investments.135  Under ERISA, each plan must specify one person as a 
fiduciary—that person can be held personally liable for breaches of 
ERISA’s fiduciary duty standards.136  A plan fiduciary must administer 
the plan investments “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under 
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”137  In addition, a 
fiduciary must “diversif[y] the investments of the plan so as to minimize 
the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly 
prudent not to do so.”138 
Certain aspects of the scope of the fiduciary duty rule have resulted 
in RICs becoming an increasingly important investment option for 
qualified plans and IRAs.  First, Congress exempted individually 
established IRAs from most aspects of ERISA, including the fiduciary 
standards.139  Second, the ERISA fiduciary rules also do not apply to 
 
manner as regular IRA); id. § 408A(c) (no deduction for contributions); id. § 408(d)(1) (no tax on 
qualified distributions). 
130. Coverdell education savings accounts, originally called Education IRAs, were created in 
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.  See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 213(a) (exempting 
Coverdell education savings accounts from taxation).  Contributions to Coverdale accounts are 
not deductible but the earnings and distributions are tax-exempt to the extent they do not exceed 
the beneficiary’s qualified education expenses.  See I.R.C. § 530(d)(2). 
131. Simple IRAs were created in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996.  See Pub. L. 
No. 104-188, § 1421(a), 110 Stat. 175 (codified at I.R.C. § 408(p) and amending section 408 to 
define “simple retirement account”). 
132. SEP IRAs were created in the Revenue Act of 1978.  See Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 152(b), 
92 Stat. 2763 (codified at I.R.C. § 408(k) and amending section 408 to define “simplified 
employee pension”). 
133. A SARSEP is a simplified employee pension set up before 1997.  SARSEP IRAs were 
created in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, but a new SARSEP may not be established after 1996. 
134. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 118, at 42–49. 
135. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1109. 
137. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
138. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C). 
139. Id. § 1101(a) (ERISA applies only to “employee” benefit plans).  Note that in very 
limited circumstances an IRA offered by an employer may constitute an “employee benefit plan” 
under ERISA, such as a SARSEP or Simple IRA.  See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(1) (2013) 
(providing safe harbor rules so that the IRA payroll deduction program is not employee benefit 
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certain self-directed 401(k) plans, so-called 404(c) plans, which must 
offer a participant the opportunity to exercise control over assets in his 
account and the opportunity to choose from a broad range of investment 
alternatives.140 
For plans subject to the ERISA fiduciary rules, an investment in RIC 
shares does not make the underlying investments of the RIC “plan 
assets.”141  Although the RIC shares themselves will constitute plan 
assets, and the plan fiduciary will be subject to the ERISA fiduciary 
rules with respect to the RIC shares, the rules will not apply to the 
investments made by the RICs themselves.142  Finally, in evaluating 
whether a fiduciary has discharged his duties, the Act considers whether 
he has diversified the investment to minimize the risk of large losses.143 
After Congress created IRAs in 1974, the next, and perhaps most 
important legislative initiatives for mutual funds, came in 1978 with the 
enactment of the 401(k) savings plan, a particular type of defined 
contribution plan.144  A 401(k) plan is a defined contribution plan that 
permits contributions by employers and employees to an employee’s 
retirement account.  In a defined contribution plan, benefits are based on 
 
plan). 
140. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A)(ii) (“[F]iduciary shall [not] be liable under this part for any 
loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of 
control.”).  The rules governing 404(c) plans are found in 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1).  A plan 
is considered to offer a broad range of investment alternatives if a beneficiary can choose among 
three investment alternatives each of which is diversified and has materially different risk and 
return characteristics.  Id. §§ 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B)(1)–(2).  Although the regulations refer to 
three investment alternatives, a plan will generally offer at least twenty to thirty alternatives.  
Moreover, each of the investment alternatives when combined with investments in the other 
alternatives must tend to minimize through diversification the overall risk of a participant’s or 
beneficiary’s portfolio.  Id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B)(4).  Courts have held that the selection of 
the fund investments is not subject to the protections of section 404(c).  See, e.g., DiFelice v. U.S. 
Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 417 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that although section 404(c) does 
limit a fiduciary’s liability for losses, losses due to the selection of fund investment are not 
protected).  Various other requirements are found in the cited regulations.  See id. (noting that it is 
a “fiduciary function” to limit or designate investment options, and section 404(c) does not 
insulate fiduciaries from losses stemming from their own poor choices). 
141. See 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (stating that only the RIC shares themselves are “plan 
assets”); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(a)(2) (excluding the underlying RIC investments—investments 
made by the RICs— from the definition of “plan asset”). 
142. The legislative history to ERISA indicates that Congress believed that “mutual funds are 
regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 and, since (under the Internal Revenue Code) 
mutual funds must be broadly held, it is not considered necessary to apply the fiduciary rules to 
mutual funds merely because [pension] plans invest in their shares.”  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280 
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5077. 
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).  Under regulations, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that a 
manager give appropriate consideration to “composition of the portfolio with regard to 
diversification.”  29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(2)(ii)(A). 
144. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135(a), 92 Stat. 2763. 
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the amount in the employee’s account.145  In contrast, a defined benefit 
plan pays benefits based on a formula and from the entirety of plan 
assets.146  In a defined benefit plan, a third-party manager (or managers) 
manages the assets.  Whereas, in a defined contribution plan, the plan 
participant generally controls the investments of his account; hence the 
importance of defined contribution plans for RICs.  In addition, because 
the contribution limits are much higher for 401(k) plans than for IRAs, 
the importance of 401(k) assets for RICs will only continue to grow in 
the future.147 
The importance of RICs as an investment asset for U.S. retirement 
savings and the importance of these assets for RICs cannot be 
overemphasized.  What began as a trickle of assets from self-directed 
retirement plans in 1962 exploded in the 1980s and 1990s with the rise 
of IRAs, 401(k) plans, and 403(b) plans and the large gains in equity 
markets worldwide.148  By the end of 2011, mutual funds were the 
recipients of $4.7 trillion (about 26%) of the total $17.9 trillion of U.S. 
retirement assets, and this amount represented 40% of the total assets of 
all U.S. RICs.149  Of the $4.7 trillion of retirement assets invested in 
RICs, $2.2 trillion were held by IRAs and the remaining $2.5 trillion 
were held by defined contribution plans.150 
 
145. I.R.C. § 414(i) (2012) (defining “defined contribution plan”); id. § 414(j) (defining 
benefit plan as any plan that is not classified as a contribution plan); see also JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, supra note 118, at 2–3 (explaining that in defined contribution plans, benefits are 
based on a separate account for each employee).  Contributions to 401(k) plans are generally 
deductible, and earnings and contributions are exempt from tax until distributed.  In 2006, 
Congress authorized employers to add a qualified Roth 401(k) option to 401(k) plans.  I.R.C. § 
402A.  Contributions to a Roth 401(k) are made with after-tax earnings, but distributions are tax-
free if received after age 59.5.  Id. § 402A(d)(i)(II). 
146. Defined contribution plans have surged in popularity since their creation and now have 
more than three times the number of participants than defined benefit plans.  See JOINT COMM. 
ON TAXATION, supra note 118, at 75–76 figs.1 & 2 (tracking both active and inactive private 
sector participants and illustrating a dramatic increase in defined contribution plans). 
147. For 2012, total contributions made to an employee’s account cannot exceed the lesser of 
$40,000 or the employee’s compensation.  I.R.C. §§ 415(c)(1)(A)–(B).  The employer’s deduc-
tion is generally limited to 25% of a participant’s compensation.  Id. § 404(a)(7)(A)(i). 
148. Even some traditional providers of pensions, such as state governments, are modifying 
their plans to include a 401(k) element in order to mitigate unfunded pension liabilities.  See 
Jeannette Neumann, States Shift to Hybrid Pensions, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2010, at B1 (detailing 
states’ shift towards 401(k) plans in order to alleviate pressure from existing guaranteed pension 
plans).  Consequently, it can be expected that mutual funds will garner in the future an increasing 
percentage of retirement assets. 
149. INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 124.  The $17 trillion consists of $4.9 trillion of IRA 
assets, $4.5 trillion of defined contribution plan assets, and the remaining $8.5 of private sector 
defined benefit plan and government pension assets.  Id. at 107 fig.7.2.  Of the $4.9 trillion of 
IRA assets, $2.1 trillion were invested in RICs.  Id. at 117 fig.7.12. 
150. Id. at 125 fig.7.21. 
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For certain equity funds, tax-exempt investors constitute a significant 
percentage of fund assets.  A recent study of mutual funds estimated for 
a large sample of equity funds the equal weighted mean of the funds’ 
defined contribution assets was 25%, and the weighted average by 
AUM was 32%.151  It should be noted that these percentage are lower 
bounds for tax-exempt assets, as the study did not include assets of 
IRAs, Keoghs, etc.  Since IRA assets represent a bit less than 50% of 
the tax-exempt assets in mutual funds, if IRA assets were allocated 
similarly to defined contribution plan assets, the percentages could be 
roughly double the percentages reported in the study.152 
The legislative history of the various retirement savings vehicles 
discussed above does not indicate that Congress considered any possible 
negative consequences of permitting retirement savings accounts to co-
invest with taxable investors in RICs.  Perhaps once Congress decided 
to permit plan beneficiaries to control their investments, RICs may have 
been seen as a compelling and safe option—beneficiaries would only 
select a RIC as a retirement vehicle if it was a desirable investment.  In 
particular, RICs had a long investment track record by the time IRAs 
and 401(k) plans were authorized.  Second, RICs were already subject 
to extensive regulation under the ’40 Act that was intended to provide 
certain safeguards for small investors, such as mandatory disclosure of 
material information, NAV pricing for open-end funds, limits on 
debt,153 and governance requirements.154  Third, the redemption 
requirement at NAV for open-end funds provides investors with 
liquidity and easy exit from a poorly performing fund and easy entry 
into a potentially more promising fund.155  Fourth, and perhaps most 
 
151. Sialm & Clemens, supra note 14, at 1404 tbl.1.  This means that defined contribution 
funds were concentrated in larger funds. 
152. Craig Copeland, IRA Asset Allocation, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES (EBRI Educ. & 
Research Fund, Washington, D.C.), May 2011, at 9, available at http://www.ebri.org 
/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_05_May-11.IRA.pdf (concluding that asset allocation in IRAs is 
similar to that in 401(k) plans; overall percentage in equities for 401(k) plans is 37.4% and 38.5% 
for IRAs). 
153. The debt limitation may not impose an actual limit on economic leveraging by a RIC.  
Although there are limitations on the amount of debt a RIC may borrow, a RIC could borrow the 
maximum amount and then invest in other RICs that have also incurred debt. 
154. Many commentators have argued that the ’40 Act provisions do not sufficiently protect 
individual investors.  In particular, the independence of mutual fund directors has been often 
questioned.  See, e.g., Letter from Warren Buffet, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., 
to Berkshire Hathaway S’holders (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway. 
com/letters/2002pdf.pdf (criticizing the purported independence of mutual fund directors). 
155. Individual 401(k) or 403(b) plans, however, may impose certain limitations on exiting 
funds.  29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C) (2013).  In addition, certain funds may close to new 
investors, and individual funds may impose redemption fees on short-term shareholders.  The fee 
is intended to dissuade investors from entering and exiting a fund on a short-term basis, which 
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importantly, Congress appears to have been most concerned with the 
risks to beneficiaries arising from insufficient diversification, and 
appears to have believed that the diversification requirements of both 
the ’40 Act and Subchapter M ensured a necessary level of asset 
diversification.  Yet, the diversification requirements provide little 
protection if a fund is not diversified geographically or across 
sectors.156  The recent rise in the offerings of sector-specific ETFs is 
especially concerning in this regard.  Regardless of the benefits for 
retirement savers of investing in RICs, there is no evidence that 
Congress had focused on the potential disadvantages to both taxable and 
tax-exempt shareholders of investing in the same funds. 
IV. THE COSTS OF RIC TAXES 
The “quasi-pass-through” tax regime applicable to RICs and their 
shareholders has undoubtedly played a key role in the development of 
RICs.  If RICs were subject to entity-level taxation, dividends 
distributed by a U.S. corporation whose shares were held by a RIC 
would bear three levels of tax, and distributions of interest on a bond 
held by a RIC and capital gains realized by a RIC would be subject to 
two levels of tax.  The extra level of taxation would have certainly 
reduced the attractiveness of the RIC as an investment vehicle. 
As discussed below in Section A, fund taxes can significantly affect 
after-tax accumulations for taxable shareholders, especially over longer 
holding periods.  Fund managers may therefore adjust the type of assets 
a fund holds and change realization strategies depending on whether 
tax-exempt or taxable shareholders own a significant portion of the 
fund’s shares. 
When tax-exempt shareholders predominate, a manager may be less 
concerned with minimizing taxable income, and consequently such 
funds may generate higher taxable liabilities (and lower after-tax 
returns) for taxable shareholders.  As discussed below in Section B, a 
recent economic study provides evidence confirming this hypothesis. 
 
can impose costs on other shareholders by causing the fund to liquidate assets and incur trading 
costs to satisfy redemption requests. 
156. The diversification requirements generally provide some protection against issuer-
specific risk.  A RIC could satisfy the diversification requirements by investing in many different 
companies, but if those companies are exposed to the same market risks, for example, the 
companies are concentrated in a particular industry or a geographic region, the mutual fund may 
not reap the maximum benefits of diversification, which arises when asset returns are not 
correlated.  There has been an explosion in mutual funds, and in particular, ETFs, that are 
concentrated in particular sectors.  See, e.g., JOHN C. BOGLE, THE LITTLE BOOK OF COMMON 
SENSE INVESTING 170 (2007) (arguing that sector diversification is insufficient). 
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Conversely, when taxable shareholders predominate, a manager may 
engage in trades that are potentially beneficial for taxable shareholders 
but harmful for tax-exempt shareholders.  As discussed below in 
Section C, because Subchapter M is a partial pass-through regime and 
does not permit the pass-through of NOLs or NCLs, a fund manager 
may engage in trades to minimize the present value of these fund-level 
tax attributes in order to maximize the present value of the benefit of 
these attributes to shareholders.  Such trades may be beneficial for 
taxable shareholders, but may harm tax-exempt shareholders.  Finally, 
as discussed below in Section D, under Subchapter M, a fund 
shareholder can be taxed on gains that are realized after the shareholder 
entered the fund but that economically accrued before the shareholder 
entered the fund.  In such cases, a taxable shareholder’s tax liability is 
accelerated and the present value of his after-tax accumulations is 
decreased.  A fund manager may therefore engage in trades to manage a 
fund’s unrealized gains (known in RIC literature as tax overhang).  
Again, these trades, although potentially beneficial for taxable 
shareholders, may harm tax-exempt shareholders. 
A. For Taxable Investors, Taxes Can Matter A Lot 
It appears that investors, the popular press, and regulators did not 
focus on shareholder-level RIC taxes until the 1990s.157  There are 
several possible explanations for this myopia.  First, the distribution 
requirement ensured that shareholders always received sufficient cash to 
satisfy tax liabilities attributable to fund distributions.  Similarly, 
redemptions always occur at NAV, which provide sufficient cash to 
satisfy resulting tax liabilities.  Second, RIC asset turnover may have 
been lower than at present—resulting in lower current tax.  For 
example, the first open-end mutual, the Massachusetts Investor Trust, 
had an annual asset turnover of approximately 6%, whereas the typical 
modern equity fund has an asset turnover of more than 80%.158  Higher 
asset turnover combined with increasing equity prices generally leads to 
greater current tax liability.  Finally, in periods in which equity returns 
were high, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, taxes may have been seen 
as a relatively minor cost, especially since funds advertised pre-tax 
 
157. Joel Dickson & John B. Shoven, Taxation and Mutual Funds: An Investor Perspective, 9 
TAX POL’Y & ECON. 151, 152 n.1 (noting that before 1993, only Fortune published after-tax 
returns). 
158. Daniel Bergstresser & James Poterba, Do After-Tax Returns Affect Mutual Fund 
Inflows?, 63 J. FIN. ECON. 381, 399 tbl.8 (2002) (showing that the mean turnover rate for a large 
sample of equity funds for 1994–1999 was 80%). 
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returns rather than after-tax returns.159  In addition, when fund returns 
were generally positive and assets increasing, redemption requests may 
have been low and managers would not need to sell assets to fund 
redemption requests, whereby generating tax liabilities for other fund 
shareholders. 
Taxable shareholders will generally seek greater after-tax 
accumulations.  The after-tax accumulations of two RICs with identical 
pre-tax returns will differ based on current tax liabilities; the RIC that 
generates the lower current tax liabilities will have the greater after-tax 
accumulation.  After-tax returns are a function of the shareholder’s 
holding period, rate of return, discount rate, and tax rates on current 
distributions and final dispositions.  The basic intuition is as follows: if 
two funds, fund 1 and fund 2, have the same pre-tax return rate, say 
10%, but fund 1 generates a current tax liability of 25% and fund 2 a 
current tax liability of 10%, the assets of fund 2 fund will grow annually 
at 9% whereas the assets of fund 1 will grow annually at 7.5%.  
Assuming that when the investment in fund 2 is liquidated and the 
shareholders pay a 15% tax, because the taxes on a portion of fund 2’s 
gains are deferred, the present value of the taxes will be less and the 
final accumulation in fund 2 will be greater.  The final accumulation of 
funds 1 and 2 can be represented algebraically as follows: 
 
Fund 1 = X [1 + r (1 – tcur1)]
n    (Eq. 1) 
 
Fund 2 = X [1 + r (1 – tcur2)]
n (1 – tend) + tend X    (Eq. 2) 
 
In this formula, X is the initial investment, r the pre-tax return (10% in 
the example), tcur the tax rate on current earnings (25% and 10% 
respectively), n the number of years, and tend (15%) the tax rate on fund 
liquidation.  The last term in Eq. 2 ensures that only gains (and not the 
initial investment) are taxed.160 
 
159. Funds were not required to show after-tax returns until 2001.  See Disclosure of Mutual 
Fund After-Tax Returns, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7941, 74 SEC Docket 236 (Jan. 18, 2001) 
[hereinafter Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns] (requiring mutual funds to disclose 
after-tax returns in their prospectuses). 
160. To show the exact after-tax accumulations, the equations would have to be modified to 
incorporate the different tax rates applicable to different categories of income.  For example, if 
fund 1’s returns consisted solely of short-term capital gains, but fund 2’s income consisted solely 
of NCGs, the tcur of fund 1 would be greater than the tcur of fund 2.  In this example, the difference 
between the tcur of fund 1 and fund 2 is assumed to be attributable solely in differences between 
realizations of gains and income by the respective funds.  In the RIC finance literature, some 
researchers use a tax rate on unrealized gains of 50% of the statutory rate to calculate after-tax 
returns.  This avoids the problem of having to specify a discount rate to calculate the present 
value of future tax liabilities.  See, e.g., Bergstresser & Poterba, supra note 158, at 387–88 
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The following table shows the after-tax accumulations and after-tax 
rates of returns for funds 1 and 2 for different holding periods, assuming 
an initial investment of $1000 and the above taxes and returns.  The 
after-tax rates of return are the annual returns that when applied to the 
initial investment would yield the final accumulation. 
 
 Assumptions    
X 1000 tcur1 25%  
R 10% tcur2 10%  
  tend 15%  
     
Holding Period 
(n) 





Fund 1 1436 2061 4248 8755 
Fund 2 1458 2162 4914 11,428 
     
 
After-Tax Rates of Return per Period 
(%) 
 
Fund 1 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 
Fund 2 7.83% 8.02% 8.29% 8.46% 
 
This simple example demonstrates vividly the significant benefits 
from being able to defer taxes.  Because fund 2 is able to reduce its 
current tax rate from 25% to 10% and defer the final 15% tax, its 
shareholders increase their after-tax accumulations by over 30% in 
thirty years.  This difference would be further increased if the current 
income in fund 2 were taxed more favorably than the current income in 
fund 1. 
During the 1990s, the number of mutual funds and AUM exploded, 
and RICs became an increasingly important investment option for 
individual investors.  As a result, investors, the popular press, 
Congress,161 and regulators began to focus on mutual fund costs, 
 
(applying rate of 10%, which was 50% of statutory rate, to unrealized gains to determine after-tax 
returns). 
161. See, e.g., The Mutual Fund Tax Awareness Act of 2000, H.R. 1089, 106th Cong. (2000) 
(introduced by Congressman Paul Gillmor, passed by the House, as amended, on Apr. 3, 2000, by 
a vote of 358 to two, and referred to the Senate on Apr. 4, 2000).  This bill would have required 
the SEC to revise its regulations to require disclosure of after-tax returns.  See id.  The Senate did 
not pass the bill because the SEC already had a regulatory project to require such disclosures. 
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especially taxes—which researchers have estimated may account for up 
to one-third of the annual return of an average equity fund.162  In 
response to these concerns, the SEC in 2000 revised disclosure rules for 
RICs to require RICs to disclose after-tax returns.163  These rules 
require a RIC to disclose along with its pre-tax returns for one-, five-, 
and ten-year periods, the after-tax returns for the same periods.164  Two 
after-tax returns are required to be shown: after-tax returns computed 
taking into account solely distributions (pre-liquidation) and after-tax 
returns taking into account distributions and the sale of the RIC’s shares 
at the end of the respective measurement period (post-liquidation).  The 
post-liquidation taxes would apply to any unrealized gains or losses 
reflected in a fund’s NAV. 
After-tax returns are calculated assuming the distributions and gains 
are taxed at the highest applicable individual federal income tax rate 
(state taxes are ignored).  Pre-liquidation returns are calculated by 
applying the highest individual marginal tax rate to each type of a 
fund’s distribution, e.g., ordinary income, short-term capital gain, and 
long-term capital gain.165  The after-tax amounts of the distributions 
received are deemed to be reinvested in additional shares of the fund.166  
In addition, foreign tax credits are to be “taken into account in 
accordance with federal tax law.”167 
 
162. See, e.g., Bergstresser & Poterba, supra note 158, at 390 (estimating that for 1993–1999 
for broad-based U.S. equity funds, mean pre-tax return was 19.1% and mean after-tax return 16% 
resulting in a tax burden of 3.2% or 16% of the pre-tax return); Dickson & Shoven, supra note 
157, at 160–61 (estimating that for 1963–1992, taxable U.S. investors in certain growth and 
income equity funds lose 25% of annual returns to taxes); Robert H. Jeffrey & Robert D. Arnott, 
Is Your Alpha Big Enough to Cover Its Taxes?, 19 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 15, 22 (1993) 
(demonstrating that active manager’s alpha is generally insufficient to cover taxes); Donald J. 
Peters & Mary J. Miller, Taxable Investors Need Different Strategies, 7 J. INVESTING 37 (1998) 
(approximating that taxes could take from 25% to 32% of pre-tax annual returns for a typical 
equity mutual fund investor). 
163. Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns, supra note 159.  The Vanguard family of 
funds began to report after-tax returns in 1999, two years before the SEC required such 
disclosure.  In addition, the Morningstar service also began to report after-tax returns before the 
SEC rules were finalized. 
164. 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(e)(4) (2013) describes the reporting requirements.  For a fund that 
uses a name suggesting that distributions are tax-exempt, either from federal or state, or both, or 
that implies that the fund is tax-managed must include such figures with any quotation of the 
company’s performance.  Id. § 230.482(f).  The parallel provisions under the ’40 Act are found at 
id. §§ 270.34b-1(b)(1)(iii)(B)–(C). 
165. Form N-1A, Item 26(b)(1). 
166. Form N-1A, Item 26(b)(2), Instructions item 2. 
167. Form N-1A, Item 26(b)(2), Instructions item 3.  It is not exactly clear how this is to be 
done.  To calculate the applicable foreign tax credit, a taxpayer must calculate the applicable 
foreign tax credit limitation under section 904(a), which requires determination of a taxpayer’s 
foreign source taxable income and worldwide taxable income.  These calculations require in turn 
COLON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  10:41 PM 
2014] Oil and Water 809 
Post-liquidation returns are calculated by assuming a complete 
redemption at the end of the one-, five-, and ten-year periods and by 
subtracting any capital gains taxes (or adding any capital gain benefit 
from capital losses), again using the highest capital gains rate on the 
date of the deemed redemption.168  This determination requires a 
tracking of the basis and holding period of the initial notional $1000 
investment and subsequent shares acquired when a fund made 
distributions. 
A RIC does not need to include after-tax return information in a 
prospectus that is used exclusively for fund shares as investment options 
in defined contribution plans such as 401(k) and 403(b).169  The SEC 
proffered the following rationale for the exemption: 
The proposed after-tax return information would largely be irrelevant 
in these circumstances because the affected investors either are not 
subject to current taxation on fund distributions or are not subject to 
current taxation at the individual federal income tax rates, and their tax 
consequences on a sale of fund shares are different from those 
experienced by individual investors in taxable accounts.170 
Thus, a shareholder who owns shares of a mutual fund through a 403(b) 
or 401(k) plan does not directly bear the costs of the taxable income 
generated by the fund, and therefore pre-tax returns should be equal to 
after-tax returns.  However, both tax-exempt and taxable fund investors 
bear the transaction costs generated by a fund manager’s tax-
management, which may benefit taxable shareholders but harm tax-
exempt shareholders. 
B. When Tax-Exempt Investors Predominate 
The last two decades have seen an explosion in tax-exempt assets 
invested in RICs.  In 2011, tax-exempt assets represented about 48% of 
the assets in long-term mutual funds—up from 26% in 1990.171  As tax-
exempt assets come to represent the predominant portion of assets held 
by many mutual funds, it would be useful to know whether a manager 
of a fund that has a relatively high percentage of tax-exempt assets may 
 
a determination of a taxpayer’s state taxes, interest expense, and other itemized deductions. 
168. Form N-1A, Item 26(b)(3), Instructions item 6–7.  A fund may assume that an investor 
has sufficient capital gains to offset any capital losses.  Form N-1A, Item 26(b)(3), Instructions 
item 7(d).  Because the final amount may be increased by the effect of capital losses, it is possible 
for the after-tax returns of a fund to be greater than its pre-tax returns. 
169. Form N-1A, General Instructions (C)(3)(d)(iii).  Tax-deferred arrangements under 457, 
variable contracts as defined in 817(d), tax-exempt foundations, colleges, and corporation are also 
exempt.  Id. 
170. Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns, supra note 159, § E. 
171. INV. CO. INST., U.S. RETIREMENT MARKET, FIRST QUARTER 2012 tbl.23 (2012). 
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be less concerned with managing current ICTI and NCGs and reducing 
overhang.  If the higher ICTI and NCGs are not also accompanied by 
higher returns, such funds may be inappropriate investment vehicles for 
taxable investors. 
While there has been a significant amount of research on the response 
of fund managers’ investment strategies to changes in the tax laws,172 
there has been surprisingly very little research on whether fund 
managers invest differently when the percentage of tax-exempt assets 
under management changes.173  The results of the most comprehensive 
study to date of this issue by Sialm and Starks suggest that fund 
managers do indeed change their investment strategy based on tax 
clienteles—the tax status of their shareholders—and that these altered 
investment strategies raise significant issues for taxable shareholders.174 
The percentage of defined contribution (“DC”) assets in the sample 
funds varied greatly, with the lowest DC ratio quartile averaging 4.6% 
and the highest quartile 54%.175  Higher DC ratio funds had lower 
expenses, but had greater AUM.176  It is important to note that these 
percentages are lower bounds as the sample did not include IRAs, 
which represent approximately 50% of the tax-exempt assets in RICs. 
Sialm and Starks found that high DC ratio funds had significantly 
higher annual tax burdens than low DC ratio funds—1.26% versus 
1.02% of assets.177  The difference in annual distributions between high 
 
172. See, e.g., Feng Chen, Arthur Kraft & Ira Weiss, Tax Planning by Mutual Funds: 
Evidence from Changes in the Capital Gains Tax Rate, 64 NAT’L. TAX J. 105, 105–08 (2011) 
(presenting evidence of tax planning by fund managers in response to changes in tax laws). 
173. Susan E.K. Christoffersen et al., Crossborder Dividend Taxation and the Preferences of 
Taxable and Nontaxable Investors: Evidence from Canada, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 121, 141 (2005) 
(finding that managers with more retirement money favor preferences of tax-exempt investors). 
174. Sialm & Starks, supra note 14, at 1397–98. 
175. Id. at 1404 tbl.I.  The percentages for the second and third quartiles were 14% and 26%, 
respectively.  The equal weighted mean of the funds’ DC assets was 25% and weighted average 
by AUM was 32%.  This means that DC funds were concentrated in larger funds. 
176. The low DC ratio quartile had average expenses of 1.28% and the high DC ratio 1.03%. 
 The average AUM of the low DC ratio quartile was $1.4 billion and the high DC ratio $5.6 
billion.  Id.  The mutual fund family AUM for the low DC ratio quartile was $28 billion and for 
the high DC ratio quartile $121.98 billion.  
177. Id. at 1406 tbl.II.  These percentages were calculated by summing the total dividend and 
capital gain distribution yields multiplied by the average marginal tax rate, which is the average 
of the marginal tax rates where the weights correspond to the declared amounts of dividends and 
capital gains.  Id. at 1407.  The authors also found that “tax sophistication,” which they measured 
by the average short-term and long-term capital gain distributions, varied significantly between 
low and high DC ratio funds: 43% of the lowest DC quartile funds exhibited high sophistication, 
i.e., they distributed annually STCGs below 0.1% and LTCGs below 2.5%, and only 30% 
exhibited low sophistication (STCGs in excess of 1% and LTCGs above 5%).  In contrast, 28% of 
the highest DC quartile funds exhibited high sophistication and 45% exhibited low sophistication.  
Id. at 1414. 
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and low DC ratio funds—4.92% and 4.01% of assets—was due mostly 
to high DC ratio funds distributing a greater percentage of capital 
gains.178 
The authors then examined the relationship between total capital 
gains distributions and certain variables, such as DC ratios, overhang, 
fund expenses, size, and age.  They also found that there was a positive 
relationship between the DC ratio and total capital gains distributions 
even when additional variables were added to the regression.179 
To determine the causality of these results—i.e. to determine whether 
these relationships are the result of mutual funds adjusting their 
investment strategies to different clienteles or investors adjusting their 
asset allocations based on a fund’s investment strategy—the authors 
examined the relationship between total capital gain distributions and 
(1) the five-year lagged DC ratio and change in DC ratio; and (2) the 
impact of the 2003 tax reform, which reduced taxes on dividends.  The 
authors again found positive relationships similar to the prior results 
between the five-year lagged DC ratio and the change in DC ratio, both 
when the authors tested the variables by themselves and along with 
other control variables.180  Thus, fund managers adjusted their capital 
gain distributions as the DC ratio changed. 
Examining the consequences of changes in the tax rate on dividends 
and capital gains, Sialm and Starks found that low DC ratio funds 
distributed a smaller percentage of dividends than high DC ratio funds 
prior to the drop in the dividend tax rate in 2003.  After the rate 
reduction, low DC ratio funds distributed a higher percentage of 
dividends than high DC funds.181  Although the ratio of STCGs to total 
capital gains distributions dropped for both high and low DC ratio 
funds, the drop was more significant for low DC ratio funds.182  Both 
observations suggest that fund managers are at least partially attentive 
to their tax clienteles. 
 
178. High DC ratio funds distributed 3.42% in LTCGs and 0.98% in STCGs while low DC 
ratio funds distributed 2.73% in LTCGs and 0.79% in STCGs.  Id. at 1406 tbl.II.  Dividend 
distributions were virtually the same, around 0.5%.  Because expenses can be subtracted in 
computing ICTI, which consists of interest, STCGs and dividends, the difference between the 
distribution percentage of high and low DC ratio funds appears to be due solely to differences of 
NCGs distributed: the sum of the differences between low and high DC ratio distribution 
percentages attributable to STCGs and dividends is twenty-four basis points, which is exactly the 
difference between expense ratios.  
179. The coefficient was 0.016 without other control variables and 0.012 with other control 
variables.  Id. at 1410 tbl.III. 
180. Id. at 1411 tbl.IV.  The authors note that these results reflect time fixed effects, which are 
intended to account for time trends in capital gains realizations and DC ratios. 
181. Id. at 1413 tbl.V panel A. 
182. Id. at 1413 tbl.V panel D. 
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The next question they addressed was whether the observed 
differences in manager investment strategies in response to fund 
clienteles affected fund returns.  The authors hypothesized that those 
managers who considered the tax efficiency of their fund decisions 
could face “a more constrained investment opportunity” and 
consequently generate lower before-tax returns.183 
Using various return measures,184 Sialm and Starks found no 
statistically significant difference in fund performance based on DC 
ratios.  It should be noted, however, that the high DC ratio fund quartile 
was the best performing quartile in five of the eight return measures, but 
for only one—the Fama-French-Carhart alpha—was the out-
performance significant at the 5% level.185 
Sialm and Starks present the first detailed analysis of the response of 
fund managers to different tax clienteles.  For taxable investors, the 
message is clear: avoid high DC ratio funds.  Even assuming that the 
differences in pre-tax returns between equivalent low and high DC ratio 
funds are insignificant, for taxable investors, taxes represent a 
significant cost that reduces a shareholder’s after-tax accumulations.  
Sialm and Starks found that taxes represented an annual average cost of 
1.09% of assets.  To demonstrate the costs of taxes more vividly, Sialm 
and Starks computed a return history (for 1997–2009) for the 136 funds 
with a complete return history and calculated the after-tax 
accumulations using the average marginal tax rates on dividends, 
STCGs, and LTCGs.  For this thirteen-year period, they found that taxes 
reduced the after-tax accumulations by 13.27%, with an interquartile 
range of 9.50% and 15.83%.186  For taxable investors, ETFs and other 
tax-efficient funds, such as index funds, may be better options than 
regular mutual funds if their risk-adjusted pre-tax returns are similar. 
For tax-exempt investors, the message is not as clear-cut.  For the 
funds in the Sialm and Starks sample, although high DC ratio funds 
 
183. Id. at 1416–17. 
184. Among the various return performance measures used were monthly raw fund return; 
objective-adjusted return (fund return minus mean fund return in same CRSP category); style-
adjusted return (fund return minus mean fund return in same style classification); alphas based on 
the CAPM, the Fama and French model, and the Carhart model; and two holdings-based 
measures.  Id. at 1417. 
185. It is interesting to note that for seven of the eight return measures, the high and low DC 
ratio fund quartiles outperformed the second and third quartile DC ratio funds.  The authors did 
not comment on this fact, perhaps because many of the data were not statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level.  These findings, if subsequently confirmed, would suggest that a 
taxable investor should consider investing in funds in which taxable investors predominate, and 
tax-exempt investors should invest in funds in which tax-exempt investors predominate, or at a 
minimum, to avoid funds where neither taxable nor tax-exempt investors predominate. 
186. Id. at 1417–18. 
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were the best performing quartile in five of the eight return measures, 
the out-performance was not statistically significant.  The authors state 
that “[t]his result suggests either that any constraints faced by tax-
efficient fund managers do not appear to have costs in terms of lower 
risk-adjusted returns or that fund managers are not practicing tax-
efficiency to the extent it is affecting their before-tax performance.”187 
There may be some explanations for these particular findings.  The 
period covered by the Sialm and Starks study included three periods of 
high stock price volatility—the dot-com bust of 1999, the 9/11 attacks, 
and the recession of 2008.  Consequently, it may have been relatively 
easy and inexpensive for a manager to realize losses and thereby reduce 
ICTI, NCG, and overhang.  In addition, sales to fund shareholder 
redemptions may not have triggered significant gains if a fund held 
significant shares with built-in losses.  Finally, a fund needs to sell to 
fund redemptions only when net redemptions occur—if acquisitions 
exceed redemptions on a given day a fund does not have to sell to fund 
its redemptions.  Since over this period RICs experienced a significant 
growth in assets, RICs may not have been forced too often to liquidate 
positions to fund redemptions. 
An area to explore with future research is whether funds with a very 
high percentage of DC assets, for instance, 70% or greater, perform 
better than lower DC ratio funds.  In the Sialm and Starks study, the 
funds in the high DC ratio quartile still averaged about 50% of taxable 
assets.  Those managers may still be somewhat attentive to managing a 
fund’s ICTI and NCGs and may therefore incur costs to manage a 
fund’s income.  Conversely, once a fund has a very high percentage of 
tax-exempt investors, a fund manager may feel less constrained to 
refrain from liquidating positions (and generating income) and may 
therefore increase fund turnover, the costs of which offset the benefits 
of tax planning. 
C. Subchapter M as a Partial Pass-Through Regime 
The RIC tax regime has been described as a pass-through regime in 
that a RIC generally does not pay entity-level tax—instead, its income 
is taxed to its shareholders.  In many instances, the tax character of a 
RIC’s income carries over to its shareholders.188  In certain aspects, 
however, Subchapter M deviates from a true pass-through regime, under 
which all entity-level expenses, losses, gains, and income are passed 
through to the entity’s owners and retain their tax character.  The 
 
187. Id. at 1419. 
188. See supra Part II.C (discussing the taxation of RIC shareholders). 
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primary cause for adopting entity treatment appears to be to ameliorate 
administrative burdens that pass-through treatment would require, for 
instance, adjusting the basis of RIC shares or filing amended returns.  
These deviations may be in keeping with the original spirit of the RIC 
regime by having a relatively simple shareholder-level tax regime for 
small shareholders, but they may generate tax externalities for both 
taxable and tax-exempt shareholders. 
One way in which Subchapter M deviates from a pure pass-through 
regime is its treatment of investment expenses, such as management 
fees.  A fund can deduct investment expenses in determining ICTI, i.e., 
against the fund’s STCGs, dividend, and interest income.  In contrast, 
under Subchapter K, such expenses would be separately stated and flow 
directly to the partners.189  In some instances, the Subchapter M 
treatment is beneficial in that it may permit the netting of ordinary 
expenses against short-term capital gains.  In other cases, however, it 
can be detrimental to a RIC shareholder because investment expenses, 
potentially deductible at the highest marginal tax rate, are being netted 
against qualified dividend income, which is taxable at a maximum rate 
of 20%.190 
In computing ICTI, a RIC is not permitted to deduct or pass through 
NOLs.191  In contrast, regular C corporations are permitted to carry 
back NOLs to the two prior taxable years and forward to the next 
twenty years.192  Under Subchapter K, trade or business losses of a 
partnership are passed through to the partners.193  Because of the 
separate treatment of NCGs and ICTI, a RIC with negative current ICTI 
and positive NCGs must still distribute the NCGs to avoid entity-level 
taxation because negative ICTI is not netted against NCGs.194  For RIC 
 
189. I.R.C. § 701(a)(7) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(i) (2013) (requiring that section 
212 expenses must be separately stated). 
190. If a mutual fund’s investing activities would not otherwise be a trade or business if 
conducted by a partnership, the management fees would be section 212 expenses and therefore 
deductible only to the extent that the expenses exceeded 2% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income.  I.R.C. § 67(a).  The section 212 limit would similarly apply if the taxpayer owned the 
assets in an individually managed account and directly incurred the management fees. 
191. Id. § 852(b)(2)(B). 
192. The prohibition against carrying back any NOLs prevents prior year dividends from 
being recharacterized as a return of capital and requiring amended returns.  The leading RIC tax 
treatise has criticized the prohibition against NOL carryforwards and notes that because many 
RIC investments can generate ordinary losses, the potential to generate a NOL is much greater 
than in the past.  See JOHNSTON & BROWN, supra note 69, ¶ 3.06[1][c]. 
193. I.R.C. § 701(a)(8); Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(9).  The partner must adjust his basis in his 
partnership interest to reflect the losses passed through.  I.R.C. § 705(a)(2).  A partnership, 
however, is not permitted a deduction for NOLs because the losses have already been taken into 
account by the partners.  Id. 
194. In this case, all of the NCGs are still treated as a dividend and not a return of capital 
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shareholders, operating losses reduce the fund’s NAV and thus will 
result in a lower gain (or greater loss) upon the sale of fund shares.  
Because the gain or loss from the sale of RIC shares is generally capital 
(and assuming that any gain or loss would be long term), any operating 
losses in essence provide a 20% tax benefit instead of a potential 39.6% 
tax benefit if the losses could be passed through to taxable shareholders. 
A RIC also cannot pass through NCLs—capital losses in excess of 
capital gains.  Instead, NCLs become capital loss carryforwards and can 
be carried forward for an unlimited number of years.195  Since NCLs are 
reflected in NAV, a shareholder only benefits from NCLs when he sells 
or redeems his shares—his gain is reduced or his loss is increased. 
Although a RIC’s capital loss carryovers are treated similarly to how 
they are treated in the hands of an individual shareholder, the presence 
of a separate, entity-level capital loss carryforward may cause a fund 
manager to engage in trades that he would not otherwise do in the 
absence of this rule.  If a capital loss carryforward is not used in a given 
year, its present value declines.  For example, using a discount rate of 
5%, the present value of a capital loss carryforward in year 8 is only 
67% of the year 1 amount; with a discount rate of 7%, it drops to 
57%.196  Thus, a capital loss carryforward is a wasting asset and failure 
to use it as quickly as possible results in an economic loss to taxable 
shareholders. 
If a fund has a capital loss carryover, a manager will have the 
incentive to realize gains as any gain realized up to the amount of the 
carryforward is tax-free.197  Provided a fund has appreciated assets, it 
should be relatively easy to realize such gains without significantly 
affecting the portfolio composition because the appreciated assets can 
be sold and reacquired almost immediately with any realized gain being 
recognized for tax purposes.198 
 
because under section 852(c)(1)(B)(i) the E&Ps of the RIC are not reduced by the current 
operating loss. 
195. Id. § 1212(a)(3)(A).  A partnership separately passes through short-term and long-term 
capital gains and losses.  Id. §§ 702(a)(1)–(2). 
196. The formula is: PV = CLCO/(1+ rate)8. 
197. If the carryforward is short-term, a manager will have an incentive to realize short-term 
gains rather than long-term gains because if short-term losses are used to offset long-term gains, a 
fund’s NCG, which are taxed at maximum rate of 20%, will be reduced.  In contrast, if the short-
term losses are used to reduce short-term gains, the losses will offset income taxed at a maximum 
rate of 39.6%. 
198. The presence of the wash sale rule of section 1091 potentially limits the ability to realize 
a loss but still retain economic exposure to the asset.  Under section 1091, if a loss is realized on 
the sale of stock or securities, the taxpayer cannot require the asset until thirty-one days have 
passed.  Id. § 1091(a).  There is no wash “gain” limitation, even for fungible assets, such as 
shares of a company.  Thus, shares of IBM can be sold and provided that the identical shares sold 
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It is important to note that there is not necessarily any relationship 
between realized gains and losses and NAV, since NAV is calculated on 
a mark-to-market basis.  Thus, realized taxable gain or loss has already 
been reflected in NAV, and subsequent tax-motivated trades should not 
affect NAV.  Since recognized losses will either reduce short-term gains 
(and ICTI) or long-term gains (and NCG), required distributions and 
shareholder taxable income will both also be reduced. 
Permitting the carrying back of operating losses or passing through 
capital or net operating losses would be administratively burdensome 
for shareholders as they could be required to file amended returns or to 
adjust the basis of their fund shares as is required under Subchapters K 
and S.199  It is administratively burdensome to adjust the basis of shares 
of a RIC given the large number of RIC shareholders and because a RIC 
shareholder typically owns many different blocks of shares, each with a 
different basis.200  In addition, there is no simple method to allocate any 
carried back losses among the prior-year shareholders.201 
The existence of net operating losses or capital loss carryforwards 
creates an incentive for a fund manager to realize gains to use the losses 
as quickly as possible.  Also, if a fund manager observes that the fund 
may generate operating losses, he will have an incentive to realize gains 
to offset the losses.  Such tax driven trades, which may be beneficial for 
taxable shareholders, generate no benefits for tax-exempt shareholders, 
but tax-exempt shareholders bear their share of the costs of such trades. 
 
are not reacquired, the sale should be respected for tax purposes, even if the sale and reacquisition 
occur almost simultaneously.  Somewhat surprisingly, even very large funds sometimes fail to 
use relatively small capital loss carryforwards.  See, e.g., Vanguard Index Funds, Annual Report 
(Form N-CSR) (Feb. 25, 2011) (listing, for the Vanguard Index 500 Fund, gains of $1.2 billion 
and net assets of $102.6 billion, but having a capital loss carryforward of a comparatively paltry 
$293.9 million, expiring at the end of 2014). 
199. See I.R.C. § 705(a)(2)(A) (requiring partners to reduce basis in partnership interest by 
loss); id. § 1367(a)(2) (requiring the same for shareholders of S corporations). 
200. Each share of a corporation has a separate basis.  Each time a RIC shareholder receives a 
distribution and elects to reinvest the distribution, which approximately 90% of the RIC 
shareholders do, the reinvested shares have a basis equal to NAV at the time of reinvestment.  If a 
shareholder receives a distribution that is a return of capital, the basis of each shareholder would 
have to be reduced.  Under proposed regulations under section 301(c), it is possible to have gain 
on some shares but not on others when a distribution constitutes a return of capital.  See id. § 
301(c); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-2, 74 Fed. Reg. 3509-3513 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
201. Under Subchapter K, when a partner’s interest in a partnership changes during the year, 
his distributive share of partnership items must be determined by taking into account his varying 
interest in the partnership.  I.R.C. § 706(d)(1).  A partner’s interest can be determined by either 
closing the books or prorating partnership items.  Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(c)(2)(ii) (2013).  Special 
rules apply to expenses of cash basis items.  See I.R.C. § 706(d)(2). 
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D. Taxable Investors and Other Peoples’ Gains and Losses 
A RIC generally avoids entity-level taxation by distributing all of its 
ICTI and NCGs.  Since tax-exempt shareholders are not subject to tax 
on the distributions, it would appear that they would care about a RIC’s 
economic income but be indifferent to a RIC’s taxable income.  Part 
IV.B showed that when tax-exempt shareholders predominate, mixing 
tax-exempt and taxable investors generates tax externalities for taxable 
investors.202  When taxable shareholders predominate, the RIC tax 
regime may generate tax externalities for tax-exempt investors.  The 
prior Section focused on certain aspects of the partial pass-through 
regime of Subchapter M that may result in managers effecting trades 
solely to eliminate entity-level current operating losses and capital loss 
carryforwards.  This Section focuses on managers’ actions to reduce 
ICTI and tax overhang, handling redemption requests of other fund 
shareholders, and complying with distribution and other tax-related 
requirements. 
A fund generates income or loss when the fund manager decides to 
sell (or hold) particular assets: gains and losses arise from the sale of 
investment assets, such as stocks, bonds, options, forwards, and futures 
and income arises from dividends and interest received from stocks and 
bonds.  A fund manager may unilaterally decide to sell to change the 
composition of the fund portfolio, manage the fund’s ICTI or NCGs, or 
raise cash to fund shareholders’ redemption requests.203 
Given the significant costs that taxes can represent, a fund manager’s 
ability to defer fund gains and shareholder taxes can materially increase 
shareholders’ after-tax accumulations.  This suggests that taxable 
shareholders may avoid funds with high tax burdens.  Since fund 
managers are generally compensated on the basis of AUM,204 they will 
have an incentive to minimize ICTI and NCGs so as to attract more 
 
202. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the tax consequences generally when tax-exempt 
shareholders predominate). 
203. A fund could also realize income or loss involuntarily, for example, when a company is 
acquired in a taxable transaction, a company is liquidated, its bonds become worthless, or its 
bonds are redeemed. 
204. Daniel N. Deli, Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation, 57 J. FIN. 
109, 115 (2002) (“We find that 4,833 (93 percent) of the funds had advisory contracts based 
solely on a percent of assets.”); Jerold B. Warner & Joanna Shuang Wu, Why Do Mutual Fund 
Advisory Contracts Change? Performance, Growth, and Spillover Effects, 66 J. FIN. 271, 274 
(2011) (explaining that “in over 90% of the equity mutual fund advisory contracts, the fee is 
specified as a percentage of TNA”); see also Edwin J. Elton, Martin T. Gruber & Christopher R. 
Blake, Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds, 58 J. FIN. 779, 780–81 (2003) (discussing the minimal 
use of incentive fees in mutual funds, specifically that incentive-fee funds represent a miniscule 
percentage of total bond and stock mutual funds and a small portion of their assets). 
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assets.205  Consequently, it is in the interest of both managers and 
taxable shareholders to execute trades (or avoid executing trades) in 
order to minimize ICTI and NCGs. 
There is an extensive finance literature that has found a positive 
relationship between pretax returns and fund inflows.206  It appears that 
mutual fund investors are indeed return chasers.207  Bergstresser and 
Poterba, examining a large sample of equity fund returns over the 1993–
1999 period, found that net, new money inflows were positively related 
to a fund’s pretax return.  In particular, a 100 basis point increase in a 
fund’s return was associated with a 1.2% to 2.6% increase in fund 
inflows.208 
It further appears that investors look beyond a fund’s pretax return 
and are sensitive to a fund’s tax burden.  When a fund’s tax burden was 
taken in account, the same study found that a 100 basis point increase in 
a fund’s tax burden was generally associated with a decrease in net, 
new-money fund inflows with estimates ranging from 1.9% to 8.5%.209  
 
205. Also, as AUM increase, the management expenses per dollar of AUM should decline as 
fund costs are fixed—i.e., when fund assets double, fund costs do not double—and thereby 
increase a fund’s pre-tax returns.  Alas, this has not been the case in the United States.  See, e.g., 
Burton G. Malkiel, Asset Management Fees and the Growth of Finance, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 
99 tbl.1 (2013) (noting value of equity assets rose 135 times from 1980 to 2010, but expense ratio 
increased 50%). 
206. See, e.g., Richard A. Ippolito, Consumer Reaction to Measure of Poor Quality: Evidence 
from the Mutual Fund Industry, 35 J.L. & ECON. 45, 47 (1992) (suggesting the mutual fund 
market easily enables investors to accurately compare market shares and investment returns); Erik 
R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589, 1619 (1998) 
(discussing research that suggests “consumers flock to high performing funds”); Vincent. A. 
Warther, Aggregate Mutual Fund Flow and Security Returns, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 209, 233 (1995) 
(discussing research that has demonstrated investors examine performance of individual funds 
before deciding whether to invest in those funds). 
207. This is even the case although it has been demonstrated that there is little persistence in 
fund returns.  Mark Charhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 57–58 
(1997).  It has been argued that this may be rational behavior on the part of investors.  Jonathan 
B. Berk & Richard C. Green, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets, 112 J. 
POL. ECON. 1269, 1270 (2004). 
208. Bergstresser & Poterba, supra note 158, at 402–04.  These estimates are obtained from 
regressions relating funds inflows to certain variables, including pre-tax returns, tax burdens, 
style indicators, lagged fund flows, and capital gain overhang.  The estimates are determined 
using average returns and returns adjusted by one and three factors.  The coefficients were 
negative for all of the returns (implying a decrease in fund inflows when the tax burden increases) 
except for one result when “year-specific style effects” was not included and three-factor return 
adjustment was used.  The authors attribute this as suggesting “changing tastes for different types 
of funds.”  Id. at 404.  Return chasing can help a fund increase tax efficiency: new contributions 
can be used to fund redemptions and thereby reduce the need to sell fund investments (and 
thereby generate capital gains). 
209. Id.  The authors note that there are other explanations besides tax awareness that could 
account for their findings of a negative relationship between fund inflows and tax burdens.  In 
particular, they note the growth in index funds, which generally have relatively low tax burdens.  
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In addition, the same study found that the impact of the tax effect was 
generally greater in the later years of the period studied.210  The authors 
of the study attribute this effect to the greater awareness among the 
investing public of the tax consequences of investment in mutual funds.  
It should be noted that the period for which the returns were collected in 
this study preceded the date the SEC began to require disclosure of 
after-tax returns. 
In addition to current tax burdens,211 taxable investors appear to be 
concerned with a fund’s future tax burden.  There appears to be some 
persistence in tax burdens.  That is, a fund that has been tax (in)efficient 
in the past will continue to be tax (in)efficient.212  In addition, future tax 
burdens can arise from a fund’s unrealized gains (overhang).  
Realization of gains to reduce overhang can accelerate a shareholder’s 
taxes and reduce after-tax accumulations. 
Various researchers have found that larger capital gain overhang is 
associated with smaller fund inflows.213  Bergstresser and Poterba, for 
example, found that an increase of 10% in a fund’s overhang decreased 
new money net inflows between 1.7% and 2.3%.214  Because of the 
concern of taxable investors with overhang, fund managers appear to 
take steps to manage a fund’s overhang, such as strategically realizing 
losses and gains or being forced to realize gains to fund redemption 
requests.215  Current fund income could be increased, but future fund 
income (and fund overhang) would be decreased.216  The costs incurred 
 
Id.  When the regressions were run without including index funds, all of the coefficients were 
smaller but still statistically significant.  Id. 
210. Id. 
211. See id. (most regressions were run using lagged tax burdens of one and two periods). 
212. Id. 
213. See, e.g., Barclay, Pearson & Weisbacet, supra note 112, at 33; Bergstresser & Poterba, 
supra note 158, at 405 (“If taxable investors are concerned about purchasing shares in a fund that 
might realize gains and thereby burden them with higher taxes, a larger capital gain overhang 
could be associated with smaller fund inflows.”). 
214. Bergstresser & Poterba, supra note 158, at 406 tbl.10.  The mean unrealized capital gain 
of the funds in the study was 26%.  Id. 
215. See Barclay, Pearson & Weisbacet, supra note 112, at 30 (finding evidence that 
managers reduce overhang to attract new investors).  Redemptions requests are generally paid in 
cash, but may be paid in-kind with the distribution of securities.  See infra note 221 and 
accompanying text (discussing the surprising combination of taxable gains and significant 
economic losses in fund shares).  Funds generally keep a cash reserve, but if the redemption 
requests are significant, the fund may have to liquidate assets and thereby trigger taxable gain. 
216. There is an argument that managing fund overhang may be beneficial to tax-exempt 
investors: if managing fund overhang increases fund assets, management costs, which are largely 
fixed, would then be spread over more assets with the result that costs as a percentage of assets 
would be reduced.  Some commentators have noted, however, that increases in fund size 
generally have not resulted in a lower percentage of management expenses.  See, e.g., JOHN 
BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 154 (2005) (noting that management fees 
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to reduce and manage fund overhang, however, do not provide any 
benefit for tax-exempt shareholders. 
For a fund with a significant percentage of assets held by tax-exempt 
investors, a fund manager may be less concerned with managing fund 
overhang.  Since tax-exempt investors are not concerned with future 
fund taxes, they may not monitor a fund’s overhang.  This could be a 
concern for taxable investors as a manager may be less concerned with 
realizing gains and increasing the current tax burdens of taxable 
shareholders.217 
A fund’s overhang or built-in gain (“BIG”) is important to potential 
new investors because its reduction can lead to an acceleration of a 
shareholder’s tax liability and a reduction in after-tax accumulations.218  
A fund’s ICTI and NCG are allocated to shareholders on the record 
date,219 but ICTI and NCG allocated to a shareholder do not necessarily 
correspond to the economic gain or loss the shareholder has with respect 
to his fund shares.  Consequently, a shareholder can be allocated and 
taxed on gains that economically accrued (but that have not been 
recognized for tax purposes) prior to the acquisition of his fund shares. 
 
Example 1: New Shareholders Taxed on a Fund’s BIG 
Assume that a fund has one shareholder owning one share with 
an NAV and built-in NCG of $100.  Now assume that a new 
shareholder purchases an additional share for $100.  The fund’s 
NAV will remain at $100 ($200, divided by two shares).  If the 
fund immediately realizes and distributes the $100 of NCG, the 
new shareholder will be allocated 50% of the NCG, and the 
fund’s NAV will drop to $50 ($100, divided by two shares).  
The new investor has been taxed on 50% of the fund’s NCG, 
 
and operating fees have dramatically increased between 1950 and 2004); Malkiel, supra note 205, 
at 97–98 (concluding that fees have risen substantially as a percentage of assets managed and 
represent deadweight loss for investors). 
217. Sialm and Starks had found that high DC ratio funds were significantly less likely to 
realize short- and long-term capital losses.  Sialm & Starks, supra note 14, at 1415–16. 
218. Morningstar, the most popular mutual service vendor, provides detailed analyses of each 
fund’s tax burdens, including overhang.  Morningstar displays tax-adjusted returns for its funds 
following the SEC guidelines and ranks funds in the same Morningstar category based on the 
fund’s tax-adjusted total return.  It also displays a fund’s tax cost ratio, which is the percentage 
reduction in annualized (pre-tax) return from taxes.  See Morningstar Report: Mutual Fund Data 
Definitions, MORNINGSTAR, http://www.quicktake.morningstar.com/DataDefs/FundTotalRetu 
rns.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (providing definitions of and discussing Morningstar’s mutual 
fund data).  But see Russel Kinnel, Tax-Managed Funds are Dead; Long Live Tax Management, 
MORNINGSTAR, (June 26, 2006), available at http://www.news.morningstar.com/articlenet/ar 
ticle.aspx?id=167156 (suggesting investors do not care about tax-managed funds). 
219. Equity funds generally distribute ICTI and NCG annually. 
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even though all of those gains economically accrued before his 
entrance into the fund. 
 
The new investor will still have a basis of $100 in his fund shares, 
and could realize the built-in loss by redeeming his shares.  If the 
shareholder has not held the fund shares for more than one year, any 
loss will be short-term, except if the fund has been held six months or 
less, in which case it will be treated as a long-term loss.220  If the 
shareholder does not have other short-term losses, the loss will end up 
offsetting the NCG distributed by the fund.  This is tax inefficient as the 
short-term loss could otherwise offset income taxed at 39.6%, but 
instead will reduce income taxed at 20%.  If, however, the shareholder 
does not elect to exercise his option to sell the fund shares—perhaps 
because he strongly believes in the ability of the fund manager to 
generate above-market gains—he will have accelerated his tax liabilities 
and therefore diminished his after-tax accumulations. 
The issue of shareholders being taxed on gains that accrued prior to 
purchasing fund shares was highlighted during the steep drop in the 
value of equities in 2008.  Many fund investors were shocked to 
discover, much to their chagrin, that they had taxable gains—caused by 
the funds liquidating investments with low bases to satisfy redemption 
requests—but significant economic losses in their fund shares.221  This 
 
220. Under section 852(b)(4)(A), certain losses on the sale of the mutual fund shares that 
would otherwise be short-term are reclassified as long-term.  I.R.C. § 852(b)(4)(a) (2012).  These 
rules are designed to prevent certain strategic trading of mutual fund shares.  Assume that a 
shareholder has $100 of short-term capital gains, and a RIC has announced that it will distribute 
capital gain dividends next week to all shareholders of record as of this Friday.  The shareholder 
would purchase enough RIC shares to ensure that when the dividend was paid, he then would 
receive a NCG dividend equal to the short-term capital gain—$100—and then would sell the 
shares shortly thereafter at a loss of $100 (the amount of the dividend).  The prior short-term 
gains and losses from the sale of the RIC shares would be netted, and the shareholder would have 
$100 of long-term capital gain.  If left unchecked, these trades would be a relatively easy way to 
convert short-term capital gains to long-term capital gains, thereby converting a tax of 39.6% on 
$100 to a tax of 20%.  Section 852(b)(4)(B) addresses a similar arbitrage with respect to tax-
exempt dividends. 
221. See, e.g., Dave Carpenter, A Surprise Tax Hit for Even Money Losing Investors, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 16, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/15/AR200 
8111500186.html (“A required year-end practice by mutual funds is about to whack many people 
with capital gains taxes at the cruelest of times: when funds already have declined by as much as 
40 percent this year.  Even though a fund’s value has declined, it may have realized capital gains 
over the course of the year—profits from selling specific securities in the portfolio.”); Sam 
Mamudi, Investing in Funds: A Monthly Analysis, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2008, at R1 (“Fund 
shareholders are facing the double whammy of negative returns plus, at some funds, a tax bill 
caused by fund managers unloading assets to cover redemptions.  Along with swallowing losses 
exceeding 40% on many stock funds, some fund investors will get year-end capital-gains 
distributions on which they’ll have to pay 15% tax.”); Jeff Plungis & Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam, 
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issue has received significant discussion in the academic literature and 
financial popular press, but the solutions proffered would require 
significant changes to Subchapter M and other fundamental tax 
provisions, such as deferring tax on reinvested gains, or adopting certain 
administratively complex concepts from Subchapter K discussed below 
in Part V.B.222  To date, Congress has not been receptive to 
implementing any of these ideas.223 
Subchapter M itself contains a unique relief valve that funds can use 
to strip out tax free appreciated assets and thereby reduce overhang.  
When an investor redeems his fund shares, the redemption request is 
typically satisfied in cash.  It can be satisfied, however, by a distribution 
in kind of securities of the fund.224 
 
Year-end Mutual Fund Tax Bite May Spark ETF Growth, BLOOMBERG ( Nov. 11, 2008), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aEWMVQanw4SY (“Record mut- 
ual-fund withdrawals have forced managers to sell their profitable stocks to meet redemption 
requests, triggering distributions.  The tax bill will arrive even if the fund had terrible annual 
returns.”).  If a shareholder’s tax liabilities were significant, the shareholder could be forced to 
redeem more shares to pay the liabilities, thus potentially leading to a vicious circle of 
redemptions. 
222. See infra Part V.B (discussing provisions from Subchapter K that mitigate temporary 
taxation of economic gains or losses). 
223. See generally, e.g., John V. Coates IV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual 
Funds, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 591, 614–18 (2009) (discussing a wide array of mutual fund 
reforms); Shawn P. Travis, The Accelerated and Uneconomic Bearing of Tax Burdens by Mutual 
Funds Shareholders, 55 TAX LAW. 819 (2002) (detailing scenarios under which Subchapter M 
can result in acceleration of tax for fund shareholders and arguing that fund shareholders should 
not be taxed on reinvested capital gains, but only when shares are sold or non-capital gain 
dividends received); Samuel L. Brunson, Mutual Funds, Fairness, and the Wealth Gap 24–25 
(Loyola Univ. Chi. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Research, Paper No. 2012-013, 2012) 
(recommending that investors be able to exclude up to ten percent of their dividend income from 
mutual funds from the investors’ taxable income); Mary Beth Franklin, Year-end Tax Moves for 
2011, KIPLINGER (December 2012), http://www.kiplinger.com/magazine/archives/year-end-tax-
moves.html (warning fund shareholders to avoid purchasing funds prior to the record date in 
order to prevent acceleration of income tax from fund distributions). 
224. Section 11 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 states that RICs may not offer to 
exchange their securities for anything other than their NAV without SEC approval.  15 U.S.C 
80a-11 (2012).  The corollary is that the SEC can approve such transactions on a case-by-case 
basis.  See Exchange Traded Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8901, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 28,193, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,618, 14,618–19 (proposed March 18, 2008); William A. 
Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-traded Funds: A Positive Market Response to 
the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 86–88 (2008) (discussing the case-by-
case approval process used by the SEC).  In 2008, the SEC had proposed to codify this case-by-
case process, allowing all funds that meet certain requirements to become ETFs.  Exchange 
Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,619.  However, this rule was not adopted.  Enhanced Disclosure 
and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-end Management Investment 
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8998, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,584, 74 
Fed. Reg. 4546, 4558 n.161 (Jan. 26, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 274).  
Under basic corporate tax provisions, the shareholder-level tax effects are the same if a 
shareholder receives property or cash in redemption of his shares: gain or loss is recognized based 
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Generally, if a C corporation distributes property to its shareholders, 
it must recognize any built-in gain (but not loss) in the distributed 
property.225  A RIC, however, can distribute appreciated securities 
without recognizing gain if the distribution is in redemption of its stock 
upon the demand of the shareholder.226  The fund shareholder will 
recognize gain or loss based on the difference between his basis in the 
shares and the value of the distributed securities and will take a FMV 
basis in the distributed securities. 
 
Example 2: Tax-Free Distribution of Property 
A RIC has one shareholder with a basis of $100 in his RIC share 
with an NAV of $200, and the RIC owns an asset with a basis of 
$100 and a FMV of $200.  New shareholder contributes $200 to 
the RIC in exchange for one share.  Shortly thereafter, new 
shareholder redeems its share for $200, and the RIC distributes 
the appreciated property to the shareholder.  The RIC will not 
recognize any gain on the distribution of the appreciated 
property, and the shareholder will not recognize any gain upon a 
sale of the appreciated property at $200.  The entire built-in gain 
in the distributed property will therefore escape taxation at the 
RIC level, and the redeemed property would have a FMV basis 
in the hands of the redeemed shareholder. 
 
If the initial investment in the RIC was made at an NAV that 
approximates the FMV of the distributed property, the gain in the 
distributed property will be entirely eliminated, as the redeemed 
investor will only have taxable gain to the extent that the FMV of the 
received property exceeds its basis in its redeemed shares.227 
Note the different result if the new shareholder were tax-exempt, the 
fund sold the appreciated asset for $200, recognized the built-in gain of 
$100, and distributed $200 of cash (instead of distributing the 
appreciated property) to the tax-exempt investor in redemption of its 
shares.  At year-end, the original (and remaining) shareholder would 
have been taxed on (and presumably received) $100 of capital gains.  
The fund would still have $100 of assets ($200 - $100 of NCG 
dividend) and the fund’s NAV would be $100. 
 
on the difference between the value of the property or cash received and the basis in his shares. 
225. I.R.C. § 311(b). 
226. Id. § 852(b)(6). 
227. The tax on the economic gain ($100) is preserved because the original shareholder will 
be taxed when he redeems his shares. 
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With tax-exempt investors, this provision could be a mechanism to 
clean out a fund’s built-in gains, regardless of the amount of the 
investment.228 
 
Example 3: Fund Distributes Property to Tax-Exempt Shareholder 
Assume the same facts as previous example, except that the RIC 
has an NAV of $1000 and ten assets, each with a basis of $10 
and a FMV of $100.  New tax-exempt shareholder contributes 
$500 to the RIC in exchange for a one-half share.  Shortly 
thereafter, tax-exempt shareholder redeems its one-half share 
for $500, and the RIC distributes half of the appreciated assets 
to the tax-exempt shareholder.  This can be repeated until there 
are no gains left. 
 
There are many possible variations that have a similar effect as the 
distribution of appreciated securities.  For example, a tax-exempt 
investor could make a very large investment immediately before the 
record date and then redeem its shares shortly thereafter.229  If the 
investment were large enough, the tax-exempt investor could be 
allocated a significant portion of the fund’s gains and thereby reduce the 
taxable investors’ taxable income. 
 
Example 4: Tax-Exempt Shareholder Invests Before Record Date 
Assume the same facts as Example 1, except that the new 
shareholder, a tax-exempt shareholder, invests $900 in exchange 
for nine shares immediately before the record date.  The fund 
had previously sold its sole asset for a gain of $100, which will 
be distributed to fund shareholders as of the record date.  The 
$100 is distributed 1/10 and 
9/10 between the tax-exempt and 
taxable shareholder. 
 
In the absence of legal frictions, it should be possible for the tax-
exempt and taxable shareholders to share the benefits from removing 
appreciated assets from a RIC or absorbing a significant portion of a 
RIC’s ICTI or NCGs.  One simple mechanism would be to permit the 
tax-exempt investor to enter the fund at a discount, exit at a premium, or 
 
228. It appears that this provision is being exploited by financial entrepreneurs.  See 
Redemption In-Kind, REFLOW, http://www.reflow.com/redeminkind.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 
2014) (cash contributed by Reflow is used to redeem large shareholder and appreciated securities 
are in turn distributed to Reflow). 
229. To guard against changes in the value of the RIC shares, an investor could consider 
hedging. 
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pay reduced expenses.  Certain legal frictions may prevent this; for 
example, the ’40 Act requires that open-end funds sell and buy their 
shares at NAV.230 
The IRS has issued numerous rulings permitting distributions of 
appreciated securities to shareholders of both open-end and closed-end 
funds.231  One of the required representations to obtain a private letter 
ruling appears to be that the fund distribute a pro rata share of each of 
its securities (subject to certain exceptions, e.g., restricted and 
unregistered securities), and the ratio of the aggregate tax basis of the 
distributed securities to the total aggregate tax basis of the RIC’s 
securities is approximately equal to the percentage of the RIC’s 
securities being distributed.232  This requirement ensures that a 
redeeming shareholder can only take a proportionate amount of 
unrealized appreciation from the RIC.233  If the redeeming investor is a 
tax-exempt investor that is being affirmatively used to extract 
appreciated securities, however, this requirement does not prevent the 
untoward extraction of built-in gains. 
The representations in the letter rulings do not seem to be required by 
the statute or regulations, and it is not clear why a fund would need to 
apply for a ruling for a transaction that clearly falls within the scope of 
the statute.  There is some question whether section 852(b)(6) is 
intended to apply exclusively to open-end funds, but the statute is 
certainly not limited to open-end funds, and the IRS has issued letters to 
closed-end funds allowing them to avail themselves of this provision.  
Not surprisingly, section 852(b)(6) has been subject to criticism, and 
there have been calls for its repeal.234 
 
230. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(c) (2012) (authorizing the SEC to create rules on distribution and 
redemption prices, regarding NAV); 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (2013) (setting the price for 
distribution and redemption of a RIC’s shares to its NAV). 
231. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-09-013 (Nov. 17, 2004) (permitting distributions of 
appreciated securities to requesting shareholders from both open-end and closed-end funds). 
232. See, e.g., id. (“[S]ecurities distributed will have an aggregate tax basis that, as a 
percentage of the Fund’s aggregate tax basis in all its assets prior to the redemption, is no more 
than 1 percentage point lower than the percentage of the assets that are being distributed by the 
Fund.”).  One ruling states that following this approach, a redemption will “neither defer the 
recognition of gain to Fund’s nonredeeming shareholders nor permit the disproportionate deferral 
of tax at Fund’s level.”  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2004-14-043 (Apr. 2, 2004); see Signature Financial 
Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 1261284, at *6 (Dec. 28, 1999) (recommending 
that no action be taken where mutual fund distributes pro rata its portfolio securities to an 
affiliated party in response to a redemption request, regardless of whether that party is a RIC). 
233. For example, applying the approach of the rulings to the facts in Example 3 above, since 
50% of the assets are being distributed ($200/$400), the fund could distribute securities with an 
adjusted basis equal to $150, which is equal to 50% of the total aggregate tax basis of the RIC’s 
securities (the sum of $100 of the original securities and $200 of the contributed cash). 
234. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, ETFs as Tax Shelters, 131 TAX NOTES 1235, 1240 (2011) 
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This provision is a key factor for the extreme tax efficiency of ETFs 
as they use it to distribute low basis property to large, redeeming 
shareholders and thereby strip out almost all appreciated assets and 
consequently any future gains.235  For instance, for taxable year 2012, 
in one large ETF family, iShares, only two of the funds recognized any 
capital gains.236  Congress does not seem to be concerned with RICs 
distributing property tax-free, and the SEC believes that at least with 
respect to ETFs, the redemption provision helps ensure that that the 
publicly traded price of the ETF will not diverge significantly from the 
NAV of the ETF, thereby alleviating the problem that oftentimes 
plagues closed-end funds of share prices trading at a discount or 
premium to a fund’s NAV.237 
In addition to the problem of overhang, which can result in the 
allocation to new fund investors of taxable gains that accrued before the 
investors entered the fund, the separate treatment of fund-level gains 
and shareholder-level gains can result in the acceleration of taxable gain 
as the same gains can be taxed temporarily to both departing and current 
shareholders. 
 
Example 5: Double Taxation of the Same Economic Gain 
Shareholders 1 and 2 each invest $100 into fund, which 
purchases an asset for $200.  During the next two years, the 
asset appreciates to $300.  Shareholder 2 redeems his share for 
$150, which fund satisfies by selling the asset and distributing 
$150 to Shareholder 2.  At end of year 2, fund will distribute 
$100 of NCG to Shareholder 1, and Shareholder 2 will be taxed 
on $50 of gain, the difference between his initial investment and 
amount received at redemption. 
 
 
(criticizing the section 852(b)(6) loophole and its protection by the fund industry). 
235. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, When ETFs Pass Along Gains, INVESTMENT NEWS(Feb. 11, 
2008), www.twentyfirst.com/pdf/Investment_News/2008/when_etfs_pass_along_gains_IN_ 
feb11_2008.pdf (“[D]istributions in kind are the linchpin of ETFs; an entire industry has been 
built on the distribution-in-kind ‘glitch.’”).  The redemption option is only available to large 
shareholders. 
236. BLACKROCK, ISHARES 2012 DISTRIBUTIONS—YEAR END TAX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 
(2012), available at http://us.ishares.com/content/stream.jsp?url=/content/en_us/repository/re 
source/tax/2012_distribution_summary_information.pdf. 
237. Exchange Traded Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8901, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 28,193, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,618, 14,620 (proposed Mar. 18, 2008) (“The ability of 
financial institutions to purchase and redeem creation units at each day’s NAV creates arbitrage 
opportunities that may help keep the market price of ETF shares near the NAV per share of the 
ETF.”). 
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In this example, there is $100 of taxable and economic gain that 
accrued to and should be taxed equally to both Shareholders 1 and 2.  
Because NCGs are allocated only to the shareholders of record, all of 
the NCGs realized by the fund are taxed to Shareholder 1, but 
Shareholder 2 is also taxed on his share of the of NCGs ($50) when he 
redeems his shares.  Thus, Shareholder 1 is paying tax on $50 of NCG 
that is economically attributable to Shareholder 2 and on which 
Shareholder 2 was taxed when he left the fund.  Because the fund’s 
NAV is $50 ($300 - $150 (Shareholder 1) - $100 (NCGs)) and 
Shareholder 1’s basis is $100, when he sells his shares, he will realize a 
loss of $50 that can be used to offset the $100 of NCGs on which he 
was taxed.  If, however, he does not sell his shares, his taxable gain is 
accelerated and his after-tax accumulation is reduced.  Also, if he sells 
his shares the following year and does not have sufficient gains to offset 
the loss, the loss must be carried over to subsequent years until the 
shareholder has sufficient gains to offset the loss. 
This example also highlights how redeeming shareholders can 
impose costs on remaining shareholders.  When an investor wishes to 
redeem his RIC shares, the RIC generally must return cash (or 
securities) equal to the fund’s NAV.  Small redemptions can be handled 
with the cash retained by a fund, but larger redemptions eventually 
require a fund to liquidate investments to generate cash.238  A fund’s 
selling activity to meet redemption requests potentially generates three 
costs.  First, the actual sales will entail brokerage fees.239  Second, sales 
of shares are sold at the bid price and thereby generate sales costs.240  
Finally, when a fund sells shares to satisfy a redemption request, the 
shares sold by the RIC may generate taxable gain and thereby increase a 
fund’s ICTI or NCG.  An increase in either ICTI or NCG generates 
taxable income for taxable shareholders and thereby increases 
administrative and compliance costs.  Either taxable or tax-exempt 
investors can initiate redemptions, but taxable investors appear to 
redeem more frequently than tax-exempt investors. 
 
238. To the extent that a fund has daily inflows greater than outflows, there is no need to sell 
assets to fund redemptions. 
239. Richard Edelen, Richard Evans & Gregory Kadlec, Shedding Light on “Invisible” Costs: 
Trading Costs and Mutual Fund Performance, 69 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 33, 35–36 (2013) (discussing 
and defining brokerage cost). 
240. Id. at 36 (discussing and defining bid-ask spread cost).  In addition to brokerage 
commissions and bid-ask spreads, a fund’s buying and selling will cause the price of the share to 
increase or decrease with each buy or sell order.  This is referred to as “price impact,” and it can 
be greater in magnitude than commissions and bid-ask spreads.  Id. at 36–37 (discussing and 
defining price impact cost). 
COLON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  10:41 PM 
828 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  45 
The prior examples illustrate how Subchapter M can potentially 
result in a temporary acceleration of gains when a shareholder redeems 
and recognizes gains and those same gains when realized by a fund are 
distributed to current shareholders.  Subchapter M can also permit the 
temporary duplication of losses. 
 
Example 6: Temporary Duplication of Losses 
Assume that Shareholders 1 and 2 each invest $100 into fund, 
which purchases an asset for $200.  During the next two years, 
the asset declines in value to $100, and Shareholder 2 redeems 
his share for $50, which fund satisfies by selling the asset and 
distributing $50 to Shareholder 2.  At end of year 2, the fund 
will have a $100 capital loss carryover, and Shareholder 2 will 
have a $50 LTCL.  Assume the fund reinvests the $50, which 
increases in value to $150, at which time the fund sells the 
asset, offsetting the $100 gain with the capital loss carryover. 
 
In this example, the $50 tax loss recognized by Shareholder 2 when 
he redeemed stayed in the fund, and when the new asset increased in 
value, the fund was able to use the $50 to offset the subsequent gain.  In 
essence, Shareholder 1 is getting the temporary benefit of Shareholder 
2’s loss: Shareholder 1 invested $100, his funds shares are worth $150, 
with no further gain or loss in the fund assets, and he has not paid any 
income tax.  When he sells his share for $150, he will recognize the $50 
of gain corresponding to his economic gain. 
E. Summary 
Certain aspects of Subchapter M can create potential tax externalities 
for both taxable and tax-exempt shareholders.  When tax-exempt 
shareholders predominate, fund managers focus less on reducing ICTI 
and NCGs and thereby generate greater tax burdens and smaller 
accumulations for taxable shareholders.  When fund managers focus on 
managing ICTI, NCGs, and fund overhang, taxable shareholders may 
benefit, provided the tax savings exceed the tax-motivated trading costs, 
but tax-exempt shareholders bear their share of these costs with little or 
no corresponding economic benefit.  Finally, Subchapter M can result in 
the temporary acceleration of gains to non-redeeming shareholders and 
the temporary duplication of losses. 
V.  MODIFYING THE RIC TAX REGIME TO MITIGATE TAX EXTERNALITIES 
This Part discusses possible legislative and regulatory actions that 
may help to mitigate some of the tax externalities discussed above.  
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Tax-exempt assets can be expected to constitute an increasing 
percentage of mutual fund assets, and the conflicts between taxable and 
tax-exempt investors will increase. 
Other commentators, focusing solely on taxable U.S. investors, have 
proffered suggestions to amend Subchapter M to diminish some of the 
tax externalities discussed above.  A common suggestion is for 
Congress to exempt capital gains realized by RICs from taxation, or 
alternatively, exempt reinvested capital gains from shareholder-level 
taxation.241  If these proposals were enacted, a RIC shareholder would 
generally be taxed currently on a RIC’s non-NCG dividends and be 
subject to capital gains only when he sold his shares.  Thus, a RIC 
shareholder would only pay capital gains tax on gains economically 
accruing after he entered a fund, thereby eliminating the possibility of 
double temporary taxation of the same economic gains.  Also, the 
importance of fund overhang would be significantly diminished. 
Although these changes would eliminate many of the tax externalities 
discussed above and the conflicts between taxable and tax-exempt 
shareholders, they, in turn, would also raise several issues.  For 
instance, exempting from tax the capital gains of RICs would result in a 
significant revenue loss: for 2012, mutual funds paid capital gains 
dividends of almost $100 billion.242  At a time of weighty budget 
deficits, it may not be prudent to consider such changes.  In addition, 
mutual fund investors would often be treated more favorably than if 
they directly owned the underlying assets: mutual fund investors would 
benefit from tax-free portfolio adjustments by the fund manager until 
they disposed of their fund shares.243  Although some members of 
Congress have supported these proposals, they have not made much 
legislative progress.244  Notably, although Congress made significant 
changes to Subchapter M in the RIC Modernization Act of 2010,245 
these proposals were not included. 
 
241. See Coates, supra note 223, at 614–17; Travis, supra note 223, at 848–57. 
242. Equity funds paid capital gains of $66 billion, hybrid funds paid $5 billion, and bond 
funds paid $28 billion.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 173 tbl.32.  Although these gains would 
eventually be taxed when taxable shareholders sold their shares, the present value of the taxes to 
the government could be significantly reduced. 
243. To the extent that mutual funds are owned largely by affluent taxable investors (outside 
of tax-exempt investments), these proposals would raise distribution concern.  Also, in some 
instances, a mutual fund investor could be treated worse than if he held the shares directly.  For 
instance, a mutual fund investor would not benefit by losses realized by the fund until he sold his 
shares.  If he held the underlying shares directly, he could selectively realize losses to offset other 
realized gains in his portfolio. 
244. See, e.g., Generate Retirement Ownership Through Long-Term Holding Act of 2007, S. 
2126, 110th Cong. (2007) (eliminating shareholder tax on reinvested capital gains dividends). 
245. Regulated Investment Company Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-325, 124 
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Another possible option would be to require mutual fund 
shareholders to mark-to-market their shares at year-end (or funds to 
mark-to-market their fund assets) and tax the shareholders on any gains 
or losses.  Because shareholders of open-end funds are entitled to 
redeem at NAV, mutual funds must mark-to-market their assets on a 
daily basis.  In a mark-to-market regime, fund shareholders may have 
their tax obligations accelerated compared to if they directly held the 
underlying fund assets.  Consequently, Congress could provide for a 
special rate for mutual fund gains similar to section 1256.246 
Although mark-to-market taxation has garnered many adherents, it is 
probably inappropriate to extend it to mutual funds without extending it 
generally to the assets held by mutual funds.  Otherwise, compared to 
holding the underlying assets, fund investors would, in some cases, be 
penalized while reaping a tax windfall in other cases.  Thus, if the tax 
rate on mutual fund gains were set too high, assets would flow out of 
mutual funds, and if the rate were set too low, mutual funds would in 
essence become tax shelters.247 
In the absence of eliminating taxes on the capital gains realized by 
mutual funds or adopting other changes, such as mark-to-market 
taxation, Congress (or the SEC) should consider the following four 
options that specifically address and mitigate the conflicts arising from 
co-investment by taxable and tax-exempt shareholders: (1) require 
disclosure of the percentage of tax-exempt assets in a mutual fund; (2) 
adopt measures from Subchapter K to eliminate the temporary double 
taxation of gains (and double benefits from losses); (3) prohibit the co-
investment of taxable and tax-exempt shareholders in mutual funds; and 
(4) create a new type of investment entity solely for tax-exempt 
investors. 
A. Disclosure of the Percentage of Tax-Exempt Assets 
One of the easiest and perhaps least expensive changes that should be 
considered is to require funds to disclose either quarterly or annually the 
percentage of assets held by tax-exempt investors.248  Taxable investors 
 
Stat. 3537. 
246. Under section 1256(a)(3), which requires holder of regulated futures contract to mark-to-
market their contracts held at year-end, 40% of any gains or losses are short-term and 60% are 
long-term.  See I.R.C. § 1256(a)(3) (2012).  This results in a maximum rate of 28%.  See id. 
247. If a mark-to-market shareholder-level tax were enacted, there would also probably have 
to be some mechanism to provide cash with which fund investors could satisfy their tax liabilities.  
If the tax were at the fund level, the current distribution mechanisms would probably be 
sufficient. 
248. A mutual fund will know which investors are tax-exempt in the case of direct 
investments in the fund, such as an investor opening an IRA account with a particular mutual 
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(or their advisors) would certainly benefit by knowing whether a 
particular fund has a significant percentage of assets held by tax-exempt 
investors, since such managers will certainly be less concerned 
managing a fund’s ICTI, NCGs, and fund overhang.  Likewise, tax-
exempt investors holding a significant portion of assets in a fund will 
know that a manager may focus on managing the fund’s ICTI and 
NCGs and therefore may have an incentive to engage in tax driven 
trades that provide no economic benefits for tax-exempt shareholders.  
This information could also be relevant for tax-exempt fiduciaries when 
choosing which funds to offer to tax-exempt investors.  Required 
disclosure of this information is also consistent with the requirement to 
disclose after-tax returns.249 
One possible consequence of requiring such disclosure is that taxable 
and tax-exempt investors may self-segregate so that funds will be held 
predominately by either taxable or tax-exempt investors.  Such a result 
could be beneficial in that it would better align the interests of managers 
and their investors: tax-exempt managers would be concerned with 
maximizing pre-tax returns, and taxable advisors would be focused on 
maximizing after-tax returns. 
If disclosure would result in taxable and tax-exempt investors self-
segregating, certain benefits now implicitly provided by tax-exempt 
investors may be diminished.  If a fund has a significant percentage of 
tax-exempt investors that regularly add to their holdings, for example, 
through payroll deductions, the periodic liquidity provided by the 
investors may permit the fund to hold a smaller percentage of liquid, 
lower yielding assets with which to satisfy possible redemption 
requests.  Consequently, more of a fund’s assets may be invested in 
potentially higher yielding assets. 
The presence of tax-exempt investors may also help to mitigate the 
lock-in effect for taxable investors.  For example, assume that a fund’s 
assets have significantly appreciated and the fund shareholders own 
 
fund (or fund family).  In addition, a fund that receives investments from third-party 
administrators of a company’s deferred compensation plan, such as a 401(k) plan, will know that 
the investments are made on behalf of tax-exempt investors.  In other situations, however, a 
mutual fund will not know whether the assets are tax-exempt assets.  For example, if an investor 
opens an IRA at a brokerage house that, in turn, invests in a fund, the fund will only see an 
investment from the brokerage house.  In addition, because ETFs are publicly traded securities 
and are most likely held in the name of the broker, it would be difficult for a fund to know 
whether the owner is tax-exempt or not. 
249. The current required disclosure of after-tax returns is probably an insufficient proxy for 
these purposes, as past tax burdens may not reflect future tax burdens, especially when the 
percentage of tax-exempt investors changes.  One instance in which this could occur is if a fund 
becomes (or ceases to be) an option for tax-exempt plans. 
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significantly appreciated fund stock.  Even if the (taxable) shareholders 
believe the management may not be as successful in the future and they 
would be better off reallocating their assets, a sale of their stock would 
generate gains and taxes, and any new investment would have to be 
made with after-tax proceeds.  It would only make sense to reallocate 
assets if the returns on the smaller after-tax investment base are high 
enough to make up for the missing returns on the taxes paid.  Tax-
exempt investors face no such constraints and may thus be a useful 
catalyst in helping to reallocate assets from poor performing managers, 
although their exodus could trigger taxable gains for non-redeeming 
taxable shareholders. 
Finally, if disclosure causes an exodus of assets from certain funds, 
the remaining shareholders of those funds may see an increase in fund 
fees, as the fund expenses may have to be spread over fewer assets.  
Funds with low DC ratios generally have higher fees.250  This could be 
beneficial to taxable investors to the extent that it provides an impetus 
for low DC ratio funds to lower their expense ratios. 
B. Importing Principles from Subchapter K 
For RIC shareholders, the current RIC regime can result in the 
uneconomic acceleration of taxable income because the gain realized by 
a fund shareholder upon a sale of his shares does not affect the inside 
basis of the fund assets.  Thus, a fund shareholder who sells his shares 
will recognize a taxable gain if the fund’s NAV has increased since he 
owned his shares.  Since the gain recognized by a selling shareholder 
does not affect the inside basis of the fund’s assets, when the fund sells 
assets and recognizes and distributes any gain, the current fund 
shareholders are taxed on the realized gains even though those gains 
may have accrued long before they became shareholders.  When those 
gains are distributed, the fund’s NAV drops and the shareholders who 
recognized the gains will have a smaller gain (or larger loss) when they 
eventually dispose of their shares.  Thus, the shareholders who are taxed 
on this phantom gain should eventually recover this tax when they sell 
their shares.251 
 
250. Sialm & Starks, supra note 14, at 1418 tbl.VII (revealing that low DC ratio funds have an 
average monthly expense ratio of 0.106% and high DC ratio funds have an average expense ratio 
of 0.085%, a 20% difference). 
251. Because the tax savings occur after the tax payments, the shareholder suffers 
economically because the present value of the tax payments is less than the present value of 
earlier taxes paid.  Moreover, if the shareholder is taxed not only on NCGs but other STCGs and 
nonqualified dividend income, any loss recognized when the shares are sold will be capital (and 
can generally only offset capital gains plus $3000 for individuals), and the tax savings may 
therefore be absolutely less than the taxable income. 
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Similarly, a fund shareholder who sells his shares will recognize a 
loss if the fund’s NAV has decreased since he owned his shares.  
Although the losses cannot be passed through to current shareholders, 
when the fund sells assets and actually recognizes the losses, the fund 
can use the losses to offset current and future fund gains.  Thus, both the 
selling and current shareholders can benefit from the same losses.  
When the current shareholders sell their shares, if the losses have been 
used to offset taxable gains that have increased NAV, the shareholders 
will pay tax on those gains at that time. 
Subchapter K has long contained provisions that mitigate the 
temporary taxation of the same economic gain or loss to different 
partners either when a partnership interest is liquidated or when a 
partnership recognizes gains or losses that accrued prior to entrance of a 
new partner.  As seen below in some simple examples, adopting 
Subchapter K principles would possibly mitigate some of the 
uneconomic acceleration of taxation of RIC shareholders discussed 
above and the associated tax externalities.  Applying these principles to 
funds, however, would almost certainly require Subchapter M to be 
repealed and would subject funds to possibly overwhelming 
administrative burdens, thus making the cure much worse than the 
disease. 
As previously discussed in Part IV.D,252 uneconomic taxation of fund 
shareholders can arise in the following circumstances: (1) a fund 
shareholder can be taxed on gain (or benefit from losses) that accrued 
before the shareholder purchased shares of the fund; and (2) the gain 
(loss) realized by a shareholder upon leaving a fund can be taxed to 
(used by) other shareholders when the fund actually realizes the gain 
(loss). 
In order to prevent a taxpayer from using a partnership to shift gains 
and losses to another taxpayer on contributed appreciated or depreciated 
property, section 704(c) provides that built-in gains (and losses) on 
property contributed to a partnership can generally only be allocated to 
the contributing partner.  Regulations under section 704(c) implement 
this goal by permitting a partnership to book-up (book-down) the book 
value of assets upon, inter alia, the entrance of a new partner to a 
partnership.253  The change in the book value of the partnership assets 
does not affect the tax basis of the assets, but creates a difference 
 
252. See supra Part IV.D. 
253. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f) (2013) (describing revaluation of capital accounts 
upon capital contribution by new or existing partner); see id. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(i) (explaining tax 
items attributable to revaluations must be shared under section 704(c) principles). 
COLON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  10:41 PM 
834 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  45 
between the book and tax values of the assets and is also reflected in the 
partners’ capital accounts.  When the assets are sold, the portion of the 
tax gain equal to the book-tax difference must generally be allocated to 
the original partners whose capital accounts were adjusted and cannot 
be shared with the new partner, regardless of how gains and losses are 
otherwise to be shared pursuant to the partnership agreement.254  The 
allocation of these gains and losses are referred to as reverse 704(c) 
allocations.  The result can be conceptualized as if the original partners 
had contributed their share of partnership property and the new partner 
contributed his property to a new partnership.  In such case, section 
704(c) would mandate that any built-in gain or loss in the property 
contributed by the original partners would have to be allocated to them. 
If reverse 704(c) principles were applied to RICs, the problem of 
taxing built-in gain (or loss) inherent in a fund’s assets to new 
shareholders could be mitigated. 
 
Example 7: Allocating BIG under Reverse 704(c) Principles 
Fund has one shareholder owning one share with a basis of 
$100, an NAV of $200, and a built-in NCG of $100.  New 
shareholder purchases an additional share from the fund for 
$200—the fund’s NAV will remain at $200 ($400 divided by 
two shares).  If reverse 704(c) principles are applied to the fund, 
when the fund sells the asset with the built-in NCG, the first 
$100 of NCG would be taxed to the original shareholder. 
 
Reverse 704(c) principles cannot easily be incorporated into the 
current Subchapter M regime because of the different ways that 
partnerships and corporations treat distributions.  Under Subchapter K, 
the entire $100 would be allocated and taxed to the original shareholder, 
and he would increase his basis by $100.255  Both the original and new 
shareholder would then have a basis of $200, which would match the 
fund’s NAV.  Under general corporate tax law principles, dividends are 
generally distributed pro rata, and a shareholder is generally not taxed 
on corporate earnings until they are distributed.  If the $100 were 
distributed pro rata as required under current law, both the new and 
original shareholder would each receive $50, and the NAV of the fund 
would drop to $150 (($400 - $100)/2).  Because a dividend distribution 
does not affect a shareholder’s basis in his shares, the original and 
 
254. Id. § 1.704-3(a)(6)(i) (explaining when principles of section 704(c) apply in the case of 
book-tax differences arising upon a revaluation). 
255. I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
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current shareholders would have a basis in their fund shares of $100 and 
$200, respectively.  The original shareholder would have built-in gain 
of $50, and the current shareholder would have a built-in loss of $50.  
Even though the economically correct result is to tax the original 
shareholder on $100 that accrued while he was the sole shareholder, if 
the fund income is distributed pro rata, he is taxed only on $50 and the 
new shareholder on $50. 
There are some possible solutions, but none of them are 
administratively easy to implement, and they would require a repeal of 
many of the basic concepts of Subchapter M.  In this simple example, 
one possible solution would be to require fund distributions to follow 
allocations of a fund’s taxable income so that the original shareholder 
would receive $100 and the new shareholder $0.  In addition, upon the 
distribution of the $100 to the original shareholder, it would be 
necessary to reduce the original shareholder’s interest to half of a share.  
There would then be 1.5 shares outstanding, resulting in a NAV of $200 
($300/1.5).  Neither the new shareholder nor the original shareholder 
would have any unrealized gain or loss, because the value of their 
shares, $200 and $100, respectively, would equal their basis. 
More importantly, the record-keeping burdens would probably be 
extraordinary.  Each time a new shareholder entered a fund, the fund 
would have to keep track of each current shareholder’s share of the 
fund’s built-in gain or loss in each asset.  Given the number of assets, 
the fact that identical assets with different bases (for example, shares of 
Apple purchased at different prices) are distinct tax assets, and the large 
number of shareholders of a typical fund, it would probably be 
impossible to comply with the required book keeping.256 
Even if a reverse 704(c) system were implemented for RICs, it would 
not by itself be sufficient to prevent the uneconomic allocation of a 
fund’s gain (or loss) to new shareholders when a departing shareholder 
 
256. Under current law, reverse 704(c) allocations must generally be made on a property-by-
property basis.  Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(2).  To reduce the recordkeeping burden of property-by-
property accounting, the regulations permit securities partnerships to aggregate gains and losses 
from qualified financial assets.  Id. § 1.704-3(e)(3)(i).  Some commentators have argued for 
expanding the class of partnerships eligible to use aggregation.  See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 
TAX SECTION, REPORT ON AGGREGATION ISSUES FACING SECURITIES PARTNERSHIPS UNDER 
SUBCHAPTER K 12–14 (2010), available at http://old.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20 
/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/1220Rpt.pdf (discussing application of aggregation provisions to 
tiered partnerships).  But see Letter from Terence Cuff, Partner, Loeb & Loeb LLP, to Michael 
Mundaca, Assistant Sec’y, Tax Policy (Mar. 30, 2011) (available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT 
File, 2011 TNT 66-24) (arguing that aggregation should be eliminated for securities partnership 
and suggesting that the administrative burden of complying with property-by-property accounting 
may not be overwhelming given modern computer software). 
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recognizes gain (loss), while the partnership holds property with built-in 
gain (built-in loss). 
 
Example 8: Double Taxation of the Same Economic Gain 
Fund has one shareholder owning one share with a basis of 
$100, an NAV of $200, and a built-in NCG of $100.  New 
shareholder purchases an additional share for $200.  The fund’s 
NAV will remain at $200 ($400 divided by two shares).  
Original shareholder redeems from the fund for $200, which 
satisfies the redemption with the cash contributed by new 
shareholder. 
 
In this scenario, the original shareholder will have a gain of $100 
($200 received less basis of $100), but at the fund level, there is no 
taxable gain to allocate to the original shareholder because the fund has 
not sold the appreciated asset.  If the built-in gain is realized in a 
subsequent year, it will be allocated to a new shareholder.  The same 
$100 gain will be taxed to the original and new shareholder, and when 
the $100 is distributed to the new shareholder, he will still have a basis 
of $200 in his fund share, and the fund’s NAV will be $100, resulting in 
a built-in loss of $100.257  This pairing of present taxation and a built-in 
loss makes the taxation temporary. 
The same temporary double taxation arises when a partnership 
distributes cash in an amount exceeding a partner’s basis in his 
partnership interest and the partner recognizes gain.258  Since the basis 
of partnership assets are generally not adjusted when property is 
distributed,259 when any built-in gain is subsequently recognized, it will 
be allocated and taxed to the remaining partners.  Thus, the same gain is 
temporarily taxed twice. 
To alleviate this temporary double taxation, a partnership can elect to 
adjust the basis of its assets by the gain recognized by the departing 
partner.260  Consequently, when the partnership sells the appreciated 
 
257. An analogous result occurs when the fund has built-in loss property and the selling 
shareholder recognizes a loss.  When the fund recognizes the loss, the new shareholder will 
temporarily get the benefit of the loss as it can be used to reduce fund income. 
258. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1).  In the case where a partner recognizes a loss upon the liquidation of 
his partnership interest, the partnership may be required to reduce the basis of its property by the 
amount of the loss even if a section 754 election is not made in order to prevent the departing and 
current partners from both using the loss.  Id. § 734(d).  A partner recognizes loss when the 
amount of the cash received in complete liquidation of the partnership interest is less than the 
basis in the partnership interest.  Id. § 731(a)(2). 
259. Id. § 734(a). 
260. The election is made pursuant to section 754; consequently, the partnership must adjust 
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property, the gain that was taxed to the departing partner will not be 
taxed again.  In this simple example, the entire basis adjustment would 
be allocated to the sole property held by the partnership.  But where the 
partnership holds multiple properties, the basis adjustment is allocated 
among the property pursuant to detailed regulations.261 
Again, the administrative burdens that would arise if section 754 and 
section 734 principles were imported to mutual funds would be 
overwhelming.  Each time a shareholder redeemed his shares, the fund 
would have to adjust the basis of all of the fund property to prevent 
double taxation of the same gain (or double use of the same loss).  It is 
the author’s understanding that most private equity and hedge funds that 
generally have significantly fewer shareholders and do not offer daily 
redemption rights do not make a section 754 election because of the 
associated administrative burdens.262 
Finally, in the case where a shareholder sells his shares to a third-
party, for example, in the case of a shareholder of a closed-end fund, 
and recognizes gain, neither 704(c) nor 734(b) would be sufficient to 
prevent temporary double taxation. 
 
Example 9: Double Taxation of the Same Gain When Shares Sold 
Closed-end fund has one shareholder owning one share with a 
basis of $100, an NAV of $200, and a built-in NCG of $100.  
Original shareholder sells his share to new shareholder for 
$200.  The fund’s NAV remains at $200.  When the fund 
subsequently sells the appreciated property for $200, the fund 
will recognize gain of $100, which will be taxed to new 
shareholder when the fund distributes the gain.  New 
shareholder will still have a basis of $200 in the fund, but the 
fund’s NAV will be $100.  Thus, both original and new 
shareholders are taxed temporarily on the same $100 gain, but 
when the new shareholder sells his share, the loss may possibly 
offset the gain. 
 
 
the basis of its property pursuant to section 734(b).  Id. §§ 734(b), 754. 
261. Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1 sets out the rules for adjustments under section 734.  In the case of 
an adjustment arising from gain recognized upon the distribution of cash, the section 734 
adjustment is allocated only to capital gain property and then among capital gain property with 
unrealized gain in proportion to the unrealized appreciation, but only to the extent of unrealized 
appreciation.  Any remaining increase is allocated among the same properties in proportion to 
their fair market value.  Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1(c)(2). 
262. See David S. Miller & Jean Bertrand, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Hedge Funds, 65 
TAX LAW. 309, 333 (2012) (explaining that because of administrative difficulty in making basis 
adjustments, most hedge funds do not make a section 754 election). 
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When a partner sells his partnership interest to a third-party, the 
partnership generally does not adjust the basis of its property.263  To 
mitigate the double taxation of gain that can arise when a partner 
recognizes gain and no adjustment is made to partnership property, a 
partnership can make the section 754 election to adjust the basis of its 
property by the gain recognized by the selling partner under section 
743(b).264  In contrast to the section 734(b) adjustment, the section 
743(b) adjustment applies only to the purchasing partner.  When the 
partnership sells property for which there is a (positive) section 743(b) 
adjustment in effect, the partner’s share of the gain or loss relating to 
the property is reduced by the section 743(b) adjustment. 
In the above example, if the fund were a partnership with a section 
754 election in effect, when the fund sold the property, the new 
shareholder’s share of the gain ($100) would be reduced by $100 to $0.  
Since the partner would not be taxed on the gain, his basis would 
remain at $200 until the proceeds were distributed, which would 
decrease his basis by $100, resulting in a final basis of $100 and an 
NAV of $100.  In essence, to the extent that a new partner pays for his 
share of any built-gain, when the gain is recognized, the partner is not 
taxed on it. 
Here too, applying Subchapter K principles to mutual funds would be 
administratively burdensome.  For each new shareholder, the fund 
would have to determine the shareholder’s share of his built-in gain 
(loss) in each asset so that he would not be taxed on the gain (loss) 
when the asset is sold.  In addition, these adjustments could not readily 
be done in the confines of Subchapter M. 
These simple examples have illustrated some of the mechanisms in 
Subchapter K that aim to ameliorate the temporary double taxation 
(benefits) of the same gains (losses) to more than one partner or the 
shifting of built-in gains and losses to new partners.  Because of the 
extreme computational and administrative burdens these provisions 
impose, even partnerships with a small number of partners do not 
lightly make a section 754 election.  Given the large number of assets 
and shareholders of a typical mutual fund and the large number of daily 
 
263. I.R.C. § 743(a). 
264. Id. §§ 743(a)–(b).  Technically the amount of the adjustment is the difference between 
the new partner’s outside basis and his share of the inside basis of the partnership property.  The 
rules for determining a partner’s share of the inside basis are found in Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(d).  
The section 743(b) adjustment is allocated among properties under the rules Treas. Reg. §§ 
1.755-1(b)(1)–(2).  Roughly, the adjustment is allocated among the partnership properties based 
on the gain or loss the purchaser would receive if the property were sold for its fair market value.  
Id. 
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redemptions and purchases, the administrative burdens that the section 
704(c) and 734—as well as section 743—adjustments require would be 
overwhelming.  Additionally, it is probably impossible to implement 
these changes within the current Subchapter M regime.  Subchapter M 
is largely a corporate tax regime: income earned by a fund is not taxed 
until it is distributed and losses do not affect a shareholder’s basis, 
distributions of earnings must generally be made pro rata, and 
distributions of earnings do not affect a shareholder’s basis.265  
Therefore, Subchapter M would not be a hospitable environment for a 
transplant of Subchapter K principles. 
C. Separating Taxable and Tax-Exempt Investors 
The partial pass-through regime of Subchapter M creates 
irreconcilable conflicts for managers that lead to tax externalities.  To 
mitigate these conflicts and their costs for shareholders, serious 
consideration should be given to limiting co-investment by U.S. taxable 
and tax-exempt investors in the same fund.266  Separating investors by 
their tax status would certainly better align the tax interests of 
shareholders and managers: managers of taxable funds would be 
incentivized to maximize after-tax returns, and managers of tax-exempt 
funds would be incentivized to maximize economic returns.  
Segregating taxable and tax-exempt investors could be accomplished by 
either explicitly prohibiting co-investment by taxable and tax-exempt 
 
265. Publicly traded partnerships (“PTPs”), which are taxed as partnerships but whose 
interests are publicly traded, face some of the issues discussed above.  For example, for a 
partnership that has a section 754 election in effect, the transfer of a PTP interest requires the PTP 
to maintain a separate basis adjustment for the benefit of the transferee partner.  For a detailed 
discussion, see Deborah Fields, Holly Belanger & Eric Lee, Triangles in a World of Squares: A 
Primer on Significant U.S. Federal Income Tax Issues for Natural Resources Publicly Traded 
Partnerships (Part IV—Secondary Offerings and the Impact of Public Trading), TAXES, Oct. 
2010, at 25, available at http://www.naptp.org/documentlinks/Investor_Relations/KPMG 
_PTP_Primer_Part_IV.pdf (describing the complex and unique federal income tax issues 
associated with natural resources PTPs); see id. at 33 (explaining how to calculate the special 
basis adjustment).  Because the issuance of additional equity is a rare event for a PTP, a PTP does 
not face the same magnitude of reverse section 704(c) allocations as would a RIC. 
266. It could be argued that separating nominally taxable and tax-exempt investors is 
somewhat arbitrary.  A U.S. taxable person could be temporarily tax-exempt, for example, if the 
person had significant non-fund losses.  In addition, some fund investors may be taxable, but 
subject to tax at a relatively low rate.  A fund composed of taxable investors subject to a wide 
range of tax rates also raises, to some extent, issues similar to those addressed in this Article.  For 
example, if most of the shareholders were subject to marginal tax rates of 39% on income and 
20% on capital gains, a manager may make different tax-motivated trading decisions than if most 
of the shareholders were subject to marginal tax rates of 15% and 5%.  It is probably not desirable 
or administratively feasible to make distinctions at the fund level between U.S. taxable investors 
based on (possibly temporary) differences in marginal tax rates. 
COLON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  10:41 PM 
840 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  45 
investors, or by providing for a new type of optional alternative 
investment vehicle for tax-exempt investors. 
If taxable and tax-exempt investors were prohibited from co-
investing in the same fund, any fund with both types of shareholders 
would have to split up the assets of the fund.  This could be 
accomplished in various ways.  One simple way would be for a fund to 
distribute in-kind its assets to either taxable shareholders or tax-exempt 
shareholders, who could then contribute the distributed securities to a 
new fund.  Because of the liberal rule of section 852(b)(6), which 
permits the tax-free distribution of securities by a RIC, the split up 
could be accomplished without generating tax burdens for either the 
remaining or departing shareholders.267 
The split-up of a fund could possibly be operationally disruptive.  
After the split-up of a fund’s assets between taxable and tax-exempt 
shareholders, both the parent and offspring fund would have a smaller 
asset base than the original fund, and it is possible that management fees 
could increase for both funds.  Given the size of taxable and tax-exempt 
investments, however, most offspring and parent funds would have 
sufficient assets so that management costs should not increase 
significantly.  If, however, either the parent or offspring fund were 
small, it could be necessary to liquidate the fund or merge it into 
another fund.  In addition, if the original fund were actively managed, 
since the parent and offspring fund would each probably need a separate 
manager, one group of shareholders would be deprived of the possibly 
alpha-enhancing skills of the manager of the original fund.  
Consequently, if a split-up would generate significant direct and indirect 
costs, consideration could also be given to continuing to permit co-
investment by taxable and tax-exempt investors in the same fund, 
provided that the fund disclose the percentage of tax-exempt assets. 
D. The Retirement Mutual Fund 
Another potentially more interesting option would be to authorize the 
creation of a new type of mutual fund, the Retirement Mutual Fund, 
available solely to U.S. tax-exempt investors, such as IRAs, Roth IRAs, 
401(k)s, and 403(b) accounts.268  Since the only shareholders of the 
 
267. If legislators ultimately choose this option, Congress could provide for legislation that 
would facilitate the tax-free separation of tax assets and shareholders.  When section 851(g), 
which provides for the separate tax treatment of series funds, was enacted in 1986, Congress 
specifically provided a remedial rule that permitted an existing corporation with more than one 
fund to reorganize on a tax-free basis to separate entities.  See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
99-514, § 654(b)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2298. 
268. Although foreign investors do not pay U.S. tax on a fund’s NCGs, interest related 
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Retirement Mutual Fund would be U.S. tax-exempt investors, the 
managers of the Retirement Mutual Fund could focus solely on 
maximizing the economic return of the fund (and its shareholders) and 
would no longer need to be concerned with minimizing ICTI, reducing 
fund overhang, etc. 
Because the Retirement Mutual Fund would be open only to U.S. tax-
exempt investors, many of the current provisions of Subchapter M that 
were enacted prior to the creation of U.S. deferred compensation 
provisions and that are relevant only for taxable investors could be 
abolished.  In particular, because all of the shareholders of the 
Retirement Mutual Fund would be tax-exempt, there would be no need 
to distribute the fund’s earnings so that the shareholders have sufficient 
cash with which to satisfy their tax liabilities.269  Consequently, the 
distribution requirements of section 852(a)(1) applicable to ICTI and 
tax-exempt interest income and the tax on a fund’s retained NCGs in 
section 852(b)(3)(A) could be repealed.  Also, the special rules 
regarding the determination of the E&Ps of a fund of section 852(c) and 
application of the section 4982 excise tax also could all be eliminated 
for the Retirement Mutual Fund.  Abolishing these requirements would 
not only save the direct costs of distributions, share issuances upon 
reinvestments, etc., but should eliminate tax-related burdens and 
compliance costs.  Funds no longer would need to determine NCGs, 
ICTI, and E&Ps, and shareholders (and fund administrators) would no 
longer have to keep track of the adjusted basis of a their fund shares.270  
These savings would directly increase shareholder returns. 
 
dividend, or STCG related dividend, as defined in sections 871(k) and 882(m), they would not be 
considered to be tax-exempt persons because they still pay U.S. tax on dividends and foreign 
source interest received by a fund.  Consequently, a fund must still determine the tax character of 
its income in order to determine the tax liability, if any, of its foreign investors. 
269. This justification for the distribution requirement is questionable even for taxable 
investors as the overwhelming majority of investors reinvest all dividends.  See Arden Dale, 
Rethinking Reinvestment: Tax Hassles Lead Some Investors to Think about Taking Dividends in 
Cash, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405 
2702304432704577348090646918980.html (explaining that 91% of stock fund dividends and 
81% of bond fund dividends reinvested); Woodrow T. Johnson & James M. Poterba, Taxes and 
Mutual Fund Inflows Around Distribution Dates 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 13884, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13884.pdf (providing that in 
the sample studied, 97.1% of accounts and 95.9% of dollar-weighted accounts reinvest 
dividends). 
270. A very significant burden for taxable individuals is to track the basis of fund shares.  
Each time an investor reinvests fund dividends, the acquired shares will generally have a different 
basis than the original purchases because the NAV of the fund has changed.  A taxpayer may 
elect among various methods to determine the basis of the shares sold, such as average cost, 
specific identification, or first in, first out (“FIFO”).  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c) (2013) 
(explaining specific identification and FIFO); id. § 1.1012-1(e) (explaining average cost).  Since 
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It should be noted that Retirement Mutual Funds, like regular RICs, 
would still be subject to the same securities regulations and non-tax 
provisions of Subchapter M, such as the diversification requirements—
but they would no longer be burdened with superfluous tax-related 
requirements.  If the Retirement Mutual Funds were created, there is no 
reason why these funds could not also coexist with current RICs.  Tax-
exempt shareholders who wanted to invest with a particular manager in 
a regular RIC or ETF would still have the option.  Taxable shareholders, 
who are clearly harmed by the presence of tax-exempt shareholders, 
should welcome the creation of the Retirement Mutual Fund because it 
should foster the movement of tax-exempt investors out of regular 
RICs.  Finally, the creation of the Retirement Mutual Fund should foster 
competition between regular RICs and Retirement Mutual Funds.  
Based on the returns of the respective types of funds, investors could 
evaluate and choose the best alternative.  If it turns out that the returns 
of Retirement Mutual Funds exceed those of regular RICs, the 
experiment would be useful for both taxable and tax-exempt investors. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has discussed various problems arising when taxable and 
tax-exempt shareholders invest together in mutual funds.  The partial-
pass-through regime of Subchapter M was originally designed to be a 
relatively simple regime for taxable investors.  When all investors are 
taxable investors, a manager’s mandate is clear: maximize after-tax 
returns.  This requires that a manager focus on controlling fund income 
and gain.  In addition, because of the uneconomic allocation of mutual 
fund gains to new shareholders, fund managers also focus on fund 
overhang. 
With the enactment of the IRA and 401(k) regimes, the percentage of 
mutual fund assets held by tax-exempt investors has exploded over the 
last forty years and will only continue to increase.  As tax-exempt 
investors come to hold a significant portion of mutual fund assets, fund 
managers appear to be less concerned with managing current fund 
income and gains.  Consequently, the after-tax returns of taxable 
investors in funds where tax-exempt investors predominate may be 
reduced. 
Importing principles from Subchapter K could address many of the 
deficiencies of Subchapter M that lead to temporary over and under 
 
2012, brokers have been required to report to the IRS the gross proceeds of the sale of a mutual 
fund and the cost basis of the shares sold.  I.R.C. § 6045(g) (2012).  A taxpayer must use the 
method selected by the broker unless he opts out.  Id. § 6045(g)(2)(B)(i)(II). 
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taxation of new shareholders, but as demonstrated above, adopting 
Subchapter K principles would not be administratively feasible.  
Furthermore, even if such principles were adopted, the conflict between 
taxable and tax-exempt investors would still remain.  Disclosure of the 
percentage of tax-exempt assets in a fund would aid taxable and tax-
exempt investors to find funds with the same tax clienteles, but it is an 
incomplete solution, especially for funds in which tax-exempt investors 
predominate, as these funds are still burdened with the unnecessary tax 
costs of Subchapter M. 
The Retirement Mutual Fund is clearly the best choice among these 
options.  Since it would only be available for tax-exempt investors, the 
Retirement Mutual Fund would eliminate entirely the conflict between 
taxable and tax-exempt investors.  Fund managers for taxable funds 
could focus on maximizing after-tax income, and fund managers for the 
Retirement Mutual Funds could focus on maximizing pre-tax returns.  
Furthermore, the elimination of unnecessary tax distribution, reporting, 
and record-keeping requirements would reduce fund costs and increase 
shareholder returns, a win for all investors. 
 
 
